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Bryan T. Denny 
 
Regulating emotions effectively is an indispensable human task, essential for maintaining 
proper health and well-being. While the investigation of emotions and strategies for 
regulating them has been a timeless and irresistible activity, pursued by artists and 
philosophers throughout human history, recent decades have given rise to the controlled 
examination of emotion and emotion regulation by psychologists in the laboratory. While 
substantial progress has been made in describing, categorizing, and understanding the 
effectiveness of multiple strategies to regulate emotion in the laboratory, and while 
several long-term cognitive treatment modalities incorporating numerous regulation 
strategies are in practice in clinical psychology, there has been substantially less basic 
investigation into two overarching questions that form the basis of this dissertation: (1) 
how we can effectively prepare to regulate emotion using specific strategies? and (2) how 
can emotion regulation efficacy using particular strategies can change over time through 
repeated training? In this dissertation, I will focus on one promising type of cognitive 
change-based emotion regulation strategy, that of cognitive reappraisal. Cognitive 
reappraisal refers to reevaluating the meaning of an affective stimulus in a way that alters 
its emotional impact. In a series of four studies, I will address the two above questions 
using a combination of dependent measures, including questionnaire and task-based self-
 
 
reported behavior, psychophysiology, and functional neuroimaging. In Study 1, I will 
provide evidence for the neural mechanisms that are conducive to reappraisal success and 
failure (measured via behavioral self-report) during anticipation of emotion regulation 
using whole-brain mediation and pattern expression analyses. Anticipatory activity in an 
area of rostrolateral prefrontal cortex (RLPFC) commonly associated with stimulus-
independent mind-wandering was associated with poorer regulation outcomes, while 
anticipatory anterior insula activity implicated in internal affective integration was 
associated with better regulation outcomes. In Study 2, I will examine whether a short 
course of reappraisal training (in one of two reappraisal modalities: reinterpretation and 
psychological distancing, or a no-regulation control group) yields improvements in self-
reported levels of negative affect during a laboratory task and in questionnaire reports of 
perceived stress in daily life. Results indicated that distancing shows promise as a 
trainable emotion regulation strategy, yielding decreasing reports of negative affect over 
time that were not attributable to habituation. Study 3 used the same experimental 
paradigm, adding psychophysiological data collection during the laboratory task (mean 
changes in heart rate). The combined results of Studies 2 and 3 indicated that while there 
was evidence of longitudinal decreases in negative affect for both distancing and 
reinterpretation, in distancing these effects were not attributable to habituation, and 
distancing was further uniquely associated with decreases in perceived stress in daily life 
among participants. Further, Study 3 indicated that mean changes in heart rate for 
distancing training yielded a pattern of increasing differentiability between regulated and 
unregulated trials over time, but this pattern was absent for reinterpretation training and 
the no-regulation control group. Finally, in Study 4, I examined the effects of a short 
 
 
course of reappraisal massed practice, where one engages in repeated distancing episodes 
using the same stimuli. Specifically, I examined the behavioral and neural sustainability 
of responses to stimuli for which one has engaged in massed distancing practice versus 
simple repeated viewing, versus stimuli regulated but not practiced, and versus novel 
negative stimuli. Results indicated that distancing massed practice resulted in a sustained 
adaptive response pattern in a key subcortical appraisal region (amygdala) over time 
relative to other conditions. Overall, these studies elucidate the temporal dynamics 
involved in reappraisal response patterns, including evidence for adaptive anticipation 
mindsets, as well as evidence for the effectiveness of short courses of reappraisal 
training, particularly using psychological distancing. 
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He looks on the bright side of everything, 
Including me. He thinks I’ll be all right 
With doctoring. But it’s not medicine— 
Lowe is the only doctor’s dared to say so— 
It’s rest I want—there, I have said it out— 
From cooking meals for hungry hired men 
And washing dishes after them—from doing 
Things over and over that just won’t stay done. 
By good rights I ought not to have so much 
Put on me, but there seems no other way. 
Len says one steady pull more ought to do it. 
He says the best way out is always through. 
 





 Emotion regulation is as indispensable as emotions are ubiquitous. In the Western 
tradition, philosophers from Plato and Aristotle to later Kant and Hume have considered 
the proper role of reason is mollifying and challenging the passions and emotions we 
experience. Every student studying for a big exam and losing a grip on composure and 
perspective and every bar-room patron tempted with the urge to fight needlessly may 
similarly come to wrestle with the proper way to work through a negative experience. 
The question of how best to regulate emotion is both timeless and of enormous societal 
importance, given the tragic consequences that can arise when negative emotions in 
particular are allowed to spiral out of control.  
Encouragingly, though the question of how best to regulate emotions is timeless, 
the past century has seen the rise of social and cognitive psychology, and with them the 
ability to gain more carefully-controlled, experimentally-grounded insights into the 
nature of emotional experience and of different classes of strategies that can be used to 
regulate that experience. William James put forth the view of emotions as behavioral and 
physiological response tendencies that may or may not be ultimately expressed (James, 
1884, 1894). Thus, James promoted the idea that it may not be the features of a situation 
itself that determine one’s response, but rather the interaction of the external world with 
the particular tendencies that are part of an individual.  
These ideas led to the development of modern appraisal theory, as described by 
psychologists such as Richard Lazarus, which holds that the way in which a person 
construes a situation is of critical importance in determining one’s response to it 
(Lazarus, 1966, 1991; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). The idea that one’s cognitive 
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interpretation of a situation was an essential ingredient in governing behavior was a 
crucial element of the cognitive revolution in psychology and related fields and stood in 
contrast to the prevailing behaviorist viewpoint that situational inputs and behavioral 
outputs were the only variables of interest in experimental psychology. The cognitive 
viewpoint was exemplified by other prominent psychologists such as Walter Mischel, 
who described how behavior could be explained by an interaction between variables 
pertaining to both person and situation (W. Mischel, 1973; W. Mischel & Shoda, 1995).  
The concept of emotion regulation also fit well within the framework of appraisal 
theory. If one’s cognitive appraisal of a situation is a critical factor in determining one’s 
emotional response, then changing one’s cognitive appraisal of a situation should 
theoretically be an effective regulation technique. Lazarus and Alfert (1964) 
demonstrated that this was in fact the case, as they observed that healthy adult 
participants who denied the reality and impact of aversive film clips demonstrated both 
lower self-reported stress levels of lower psychophysiological indicators of stress. 
Similarly, Mischel and Baker (1975) demonstrated this same cognitive transformation of 
appraisal phenomenon in children; children who focused on appraising an appetitive 
stimulus in a non-consummatory fashion (e.g. likening a marshmallow to a cloud) were 
able to delay gratification significantly longer than children who appraised the stimuli in 
consummatory ways.  
This cognitive transformation of the appraisal process is what is meant by 
cognitive reappraisal (or, more simply, reappraisal). Reappraisal refers to re-imagining an 
affective stimulus in a way that alters its emotional impact (Gross, 1998b). James Gross 
situated reappraisal within an influential process model of emotion regulation as a 
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cognitive change-based strategy (Gross, 1998b). As with other appraisal theorists, Gross’ 
formulation holds that emotional responses are governed by response tendencies that are 
behavioral, physiological, and experiential. While “affect” and “emotion” are sometimes 
used interchangeably, Gross defines emotion as response tendencies that occur over a 
relatively brief time period in response to situations and stimuli one experiences, whereas 
affect is a superordinate category that encompasses emotions and longer-lasting 
emotional episodes and moods, which lack a particular elicitor. Emotion regulation, then, 
can be seen as various ways to increase, decrease, or maintain one’s emotion response 
tendencies using a variety of strategies. While this dissertation work will focus 
exclusively on down-regulation of negative emotion given its theoretical importance and 
translational relevance to clinical contexts, there are of course adaptive reasons that one 
might want to up-regulate negative emotion or down- or up-regulate positive emotion as 
well (Kim & Hamann, 2007; Ochsner & Gross, 2005). 
Emotion regulation strategies may be divided into two classes. Gross’ process 
model makes a distinction between antecedent and response-focused regulatory 
strategies. Antecedent-focused strategies take place before the emotion is generated, and 
response-focused strategies take place after emotion generation (Gross, 1998a, 1998b; 
Gross & Munoz, 1995). Thus, antecedent-focused strategies aim to ultimately alter which 
response tendencies are elicited, whereas response-focused strategies aim to alter the 
responses themselves. Antecedent-focused strategies include situation selection, situation 
modification, attentional deployment strategies (such as distraction), and cognitive 
change-based strategies. As discussed previously, reappraisal is situated within the 
cognitive change class of antecedent-focused regulatory strategies. An exemplar 
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response-focused strategy, by contrast, is expressive suppression, where one attempts to 
have one’s face and body reveal as little emotion as possible in response to a situation.   
 Given this framework, a natural question is to compare the effectiveness of 
various strategies in a controlled, laboratory context. A number of studies have now done 
so, often comparing antecedent (i.e. reappraisal) to response-focused strategies (i.e. 
suppression). There is evidence that while both reappraisal and suppression successfully 
decrease emotional behavior (facial and body movements) relative to no regulation in 
response to aversive stimuli, only reappraisal reduced self-reports of negative affect, and 
suppression was associated with increased physiological arousal (Gross, 1998a; Gross & 
Levenson, 1993). Importantly, when viewing the stimulus (aversive film clips), there was 
no difference in the degree to which participants covered their eyes across conditions, 
indicating that reappraisal effects in this paradigm are not simply driven instead by a 
modification of the situation as a whole (Gross, 1998a). Suppression has also been 
associated with poorer memory for emotional events (Richards & Gross, 2000a) and 
reduced well-being relative to reappraisal (Gross & John, 2003). More recently, 
reappraisal has been compared to distraction, an attentional deployment operationalized 
as keeping six letters in mind during the presentation of an emotional stimulus, and 
reappraisal led to reduced self-reports of negative emotion relative to distraction (McRae 
et al., 2010). Distraction has been shown to entail fewer cognitive costs and physiological 
arousal relative to reappraisal, but this has been shown to be true only when reappraisal is 
initiated relatively late (i.e. after the onset of emotional response tendencies) (Sheppes, 
Catran, & Meiran, 2009; Sheppes & Meiran, 2008). Thus, reappraisal has been shown to 
be a very promising emotion regulation strategy during single experimental sessions, 
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entailing relatively few cognitive, behavioral, or physiological costs, and has been 
associated with positive overall well-being.  
 Given this, reappraisal has received considerable interest and attention in the 
fields of emotion and emotion regulation. As described to this point, reappraisal could 
refer to a vast number of cognitive strategies by which one could re-imagine or re-
construe an affective stimulus. Ochsner and Gross describe a theoretically-meaningful 
partitioning among various classes of reappraisal that one could employ (Ochsner & 
Gross, 2008). One the one hand, one could reinterpret the meaning of an affective 
stimulus by telling oneself a story about the outcome (e.g. that it’s not as bad as it first 
seemed or that help is on the way) (Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002; Ochsner et 
al., 2004). Alternatively, one could employ psychological distancing and impact the 
personal relevance of the emotional event to oneself. There are several ways that this 
could be accomplished. One is to appraise the event as a detached, objective, impartial 
observer (Gross, 1998a; Kross, Davidson, Weber, & Ochsner, 2009; Ochsner et al., 
2004). Another method of varying psychological distance is one advanced by Yaacov 
Trope and colleagues, whereby one could cognitively vary the sense of spatial, temporal, 
or social closeness one has to a situation, among other strategies (Liberman, Trope, & 
Stephan, 2007; Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007). Both of these conceptualizations of 
psychological distancing (hereafter, simply “distancing”) are theoretically meaningful 
and contributed to the operationalizations used in the current studies. Overall, regulating 
emotions via reappraisal (via either reinterpretation and/or distancing) has been shown to 
be an adaptive, flexible, effective regulatory strategy. 
6 
 
To this point, reappraisal has been considered from social (e.g. behavioral) and 
cognitive levels of analysis. Recent advances in cognitive neuroscience have made it 
possible to further examine the neural mechanisms that support reappraisal. The 
emerging field of social cognitive neuroscience is attempting to synthesize information 
acquired via behavioral, psychophysiological, and neuroscience methods in order to 
understand a cognitive construct like reappraisal through the integration of multiple 
levels of analysis (Ochsner, 2007; Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001). Viewed from this 
perspective, in addition to being effective in changing affective experience and 
psychophysiological arousal, reappraisal has been shown to modulate neural systems 
associated with emotion reactivity and regulation (Denny, Silvers, & Ochsner, 2009; 
Ochsner & Gross, 2005, 2007).  
One brain area that has been closely linked to negative emotion reactivity is the 
amygdala, a bilateral almond-shaped structure located at the anterior portion of the 
medial temoporal lobe. Seminal rodent research helped establish the importance of this 
brain region for the acquisition of conditioned fear (Maren, Aharonov, & Fanselow, 
1996; Quirk, Repa, & LeDoux, 1995). Human neuroimaging research has consistently 
noted the involvement of the amygdala in signaling salient information in the 
environment, particularly for negatively-valenced states like fear (Denny et al., 2009; 
Joseph E. LeDoux, 2000; Ochsner & Gross, 2004, 2007, 2008).  
Further, when down-regulating negative emotion, reappraisal has been shown to 
engage regions in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) (e.g. medial and ventrolateral PFC) and 
other regions including dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC), while at the same time 
attenuating neural responses in the amygdala (Denny et al., 2009; Ochsner & Gross, 
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2004, 2005, 2008). Indeed, a recent quantitative meta-analysis has shown that the activity 
of the amygdala is a frequent regulatory target of reappraisal (i.e. greater activity to 
negative stimuli without regulation relative to engaging in reappraisal) (Buhle et al., 
2011).  
This relationship between PFC activity and subcortical activity in the amygdala 
has been conceptualized as an interaction between bottom-up appraisal systems 
(including the amygdala) and top-down appraisal systems (including the lateral PFC and 
dACC) (Denny et al., 2009; Ochsner & Gross, 2007). Bottom-up appraisal systems are 
thought to subserve intrinsic, unconscious response tendencies, whereas top-down 
appraisal systems are thought to subserve conscious attention to and selection of various 
alternative response patterns that can directly influence both the bottom-up appraisal 
process and the ultimate behavioral response (Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Ochsner, Ray et 
al., 2009). Consistent with this view, activity from the amygdala has been shown to 
negatively correlate with activity from regions in the PFC including ventrolateral 
(Ochsner et al., 2002; Wager, Davidson, Hughes, Lindquist, & Ochsner, 2008) and 
ventromedial PFC (Urry et al., 2006). A recent mediation analysis found a functional 
pathway from ventrolateral PFC (vlPFC) through the amygdala leading to poorer 
regulation success during regulation of negative stimuli (defined as poorer ability to 
down-regulate negative affect), whereas a separate pathway from vlPFC through nucleus 
accumbens (associated with reward anticipation in other contexts (Knutson, Adams, 
Fong, & Hommer, 2001)) was associated with greater reappraisal success, defined as 
greater reductions in negative affect when reappraising versus responding naturally 
without explicit instructions to regulate.  
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As discussed previously, one important distinction in the current literature is that 
reappraisal has typically been operationalized in one of two distinct ways: either via 
reinterpretation or distancing. In addition to being a theoretically meaningful distinction, 
with one strategy emphasizing context-specific re-framing (reinterpretation) and the other 
involving cognitively altering proximity to the self (distancing), these two strategies have 
been shown to be subserved by distinct neural mechanisms. Most of the social cognitive 
neuroscience literature has operationalized reappraisal in one or the other way without a 
direct comparison of each. However, while one neuroimaging study reported no 
differences between the two strategies in terms of behavioral efficacy, a significant 
difference in neural recruitment was reported across the two forms of reappraisal 
(Ochsner et al., 2004). Reinterpretation was shown to recruit relatively more lateral PFC 
activity, whereas distancing was shown to recruit relatively more anterior medial PFC/ 
anterior cingulate activity. This result suggests that actively engaging in distancing may 
indeed depend on the neural mechanisms supporting conceptualizations of the self, given 
that medial PFC activity has been closely linked to self-related cognition (Denny, Kober, 
Wager, & Ochsner, in press; Northoff et al., 2006; Qin & Northoff, 2011; van der Meer, 
Costafreda, Aleman, & David, 2010).  
 
Current Questions 
 Thus far, both the behavioral and neuroimaging reappraisal literature have been 
principally focused on examining the implementation of reappraisal during the 
presentation of a stimulus and during a single experimental session (Denny, Ochsner, 
Weber, & Wager, under review; Ochsner et al., 2005; Ochsner & Gross, 2008). One 
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recent study has shown that attenuation of amygdala activity that occurs during 
downregulation of negative emotion is sustained in a follow-up passive viewing scan that 
occurred 10 minutes after an active regulation scan (Walter et al., 2009). In addition, 
Raffael Kalisch has provided initial evidence that the neural substrates mediating 
reappraisal during negative stimulus presentation may be divided into implementation 
and maintenance phases, with the former involving relatively greater left lateral PFC 
recruitment and the latter involving relatively right-lateralized anterior PFC regions that 
have been implicated in working memory (Kalisch, 2009).  
Overall, however, the temporal dynamics and trainability of reappraisal remain 
unclear. Thus, the current work encompasses four fundamental questions concerning the 
temporal dynamics of  reappraisal: (1) How can we adaptively prepare to regulate 
emotion via reappraisal? Study 1 addresses this question using mediation effect 
parametric mapping (MEPM) (Atlas, Bolger, Lindquist, & Wager, 2010; Wager, 
Davidson et al., 2008) in order to determine what anticipatory neural mechanisms are 
associated with ultimately self-reported reappraisal success and failure. (2) Can we get 
better at reappraising over time? Specifically, can longitudinal training in reappraisal lead 
to improved reappraisal efficacy, as measured by self-reported emotional experience, 
questionnaire reports, and psychophysiology? (3) Are certain reappraisal strategies more 
effective over time? In other words, are there differences between reinterpretation and 
distancing in terms of their adaptive longitudinal impacts? Questions 2 and 3 are 
addressed by Studies 2 and 3. And finally, (4) Does repeated practice using reappraisal 
for the same stimuli lead to long-lasting, adapative consequences? This question 
addresses whether repeated, massed practice in reappraisal—rather than longitudinal, 
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distributed practice—yields adaptive changes in behavioral self-reports and in the 
reactivity of the neural architecture supporting reappraisal (i.e. particularly in the 
amygdala). This question is examined in Study 4. 
 
Study 1: Neural mechanisms of adaptive reappraisal anticipation (Denny et al., 
under review) 
Introduction 
 Imagine that you receive some advance notice of imminent bad news—for 
example, pausing before entering a gravely ill family member in the hospital. You know 
that you will soon need to regulate your emotions, but you have a few moments to first 
anticipate beforehand. In that anticipation, you may have expectations about what you’re 
able to experience that may be either helpful or unhelpful in your ultimate ability to 
regulate your emotions. Study 1 sought to examine how can we adaptively prepare to 
reappraise, even in the absence of specific instructions about how to go about it. 
Specifically, what neural mechanisms subserve ultimate self-reported regulation success 
or failure? Despite the relevance of understanding how best to prepare to regulate 
negative events, relatively little prior work has investigated the connection between  
anticipatory neural responses and subsequent self-reported reappraisal success or failure 
(Denny et al., under review). 
 Though this question has not been thoroughly examined, prior work has suggested 
three types of non-competing alternative hypotheses. The first of these is that PFC 
activity could be involved in setting adaptive anticipatory expectations that ultimately 
lead to reappraisal success. As reviewed previously, PFC activity—particularly in lateral 
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PFC but also in posterior dorsomedial and ventromedial PFC, along with activity in the 
dACC—has been consistently associated with the application of reappraisal strategies 
when one is actually presented with the stimulus (Buhle et al., 2011; Goldin, Manber-
Ball, Werner, Heimberg, & Gross, 2009; Kalisch et al., 2005; Kalisch, Wiech, Herrmann, 
& Dolan, 2006; McRae et al., 2010; McRae, Ochsner, Mauss, Gabrieli, & Gross, 2008; 
Ochsner et al., 2002; Ochsner, Hughes, Robertson, Cooper, & Gabrieli, 2009; Ochsner et 
al., 2004; Phan et al., 2005; van Reekum et al., 2007). Also, as reviewed previously, 
amygdala activity has been shown to drop during regulation (Ochsner & Gross, 2008).  
In addition, a few studies have examined the use of reappraisal-like strategies to 
regulate affective responses elicited during anticipation of a stimulus, with results mostly 
parallel to those described above.  Three studies found that when anticipating the 
presentation of a negative stimulus, reappraisal can either increase (Delgado, Nearing, 
Ledoux, & Phelps, 2008; Herwig, Baumgartner et al., 2007) or decrease (Kalisch et al., 
2005) activity in medial PFC regions associated with attention to and attributions about 
emotional states (Kober et al., 2008; Olsson & Ochsner, 2008), along with decreased 
activity in the amygdala (Delgado, Nearing et al., 2008; Herwig, Baumgartner et al., 
2007) presumably reflecting regulation of anticipatory anxiety. A fourth study found that 
when participants imagined calming and distracting pleasant scenes while anticipating 
monetary rewards they increased lateral and medial PFC and decreased striatal activity 
(Delgado, Gillis, & Phelps, 2008).  Critically, while all of these studies exmained 
regulation of affective responses elicited during the anticipation of an upcoming event, 
none was designed to directly relate anticipatory PFC activity to success at reducing self-
reported affective responses to the subsequently experienced event itself. 
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Related work in the expectancy literature suggests that PFC activity supports 
expectations about an upcoming negative stimulus that may diminish negative affective 
responses when these expectations are preparatory and positive. This is exemplified by 
the placebo effect, where one has an expectation that a drug will reduce the aversive 
response to a stimulus (e.g. painful heat) (Price et al., 1999). Neuroimaging work has 
shown placebo analgesia significantly alters the neural correlates of pain anticipation and 
experience in pain-sensitive brain regions (Atlas et al., 2010; Wager, Atlas, Leotti, & 
Rilling, 2011; Wager, Rilling et al., 2004). In particular, increases in placebo analgesia 
have been shown to be predicted by increases in anticipatory activity in a frontoparietal 
network, including parts of anterior PFC (including Brodmann areas (BA) 9 and 10), and 
by decreases in activity in a posterior insula/temporal cortex network (Wager et al., 
2011).  
A second hypothesis, however, is that the PFC could be involved in setting 
maladaptive expectancies whereby PFC supports negative expectations that promote 
responses in affective appraisal-related regions like the amygdala. This hypothesis is 
supported by an extensive literature in human and non-human animals documenting the 
behavioral and physiological consequences of anticipating negative events predicted by 
presentation of a conditioned stimulus, including increased heart rate, startle potentiation, 
freezing, and stomach ulceration (Lang, Davis, & Ohman, 2000; Lang, Kozak, Miller, 
Levin, & McLean, 1980). This literature has identified the amygdala as a key mediator of 
such conditioned fear responses (Davis, 1992; J. E. LeDoux, 1996; Quirk et al., 1995; 
Walker & Davis, 1997).  In like fashion, human studies have shown that anticipating 
negative events elicits self-report (G. Butler & Mathews, 1987; Savitsky, Epley, & 
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Gilovich, 2001) and psychophysiological (Grillon, Ameli, Woods, Merikangas, & Davis, 
1991) markers of negative affect. Imaging studies have shown that anticipation of a 
clearly or potentially aversive event is associated with increased activation of both the 
amygdala (Herwig, Abler, Walter, & Erk, 2007; Herwig, Kaffenberger, Baumgartner, & 
Jancke, 2007; Kaffenberger, Bruhl, Baumgartner, Jancke, & Herwig, 2010) and, 
critically, the anterior and dorsomedial PFC and anterior cingulate cortex (Mechias, 
Etkin, & Kalisch, 2010; Ueda et al., 2003). 
The relationship between negative anticipation and peripheral physiological 
reactivity has been shown to be mediated by particular portions of the medial PFC in the 
rostral dorsal and pregenual cingulate cortices (Wager et al., 2009).  Activity in this area 
may be important for shaping affective processes in a number of ways.  For example, 
activity in this area was associated with lower expectations of drug effectiveness and 
reduced responses to a placebo analgesic (Wager et al., 2011), which is striking given 
that dorsal portions of the medial and lateral PFC (including portions of BA 9 and 10) 
have been implicated in the top-down cognitive generation of negative emotion (Ochsner 
et al., 2004; Ochsner, Ray et al., 2009).  This suggests that prefrontal cortex implements 
conceptual processes that support both generation and mitigation of negative emotion.  
In addition, similar medial regions of rostral MPFC, including portions of BA 9 
and 10, have been implictated in subserving mind-wandering (Christoff, Gordon, 
Smallwood, Smith, & Schooler, 2009; Mason et al., 2007), which is similar to 
anticipation in that the mind is engaged in thoughts that are not directly related to current 
stimulus presentation. Mind-wandering has been shown to recruit a similar network of 
regions as the brain’s default mode, which involves regions that are relatively more active 
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when at rest and not engaged in task performance (Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & 
Raichle, 2001; Raichle et al., 2001). Interestingly, a recent experience-sampling study has 
shown that people mind-wander frequently regardless of current activities and are less 
happy when they do so, and that mind-wandering is often a cause, rather than a 
consequence, of unhappiness (Killingsworth & Gilbert, 2010). If one were to engage in 
mind-wandering during reappraisal anticipation, especially if you are unaware of the 
exact nature of the forthcoming stimulus presentation, it’s possible that you would later 
be less prepared to successfully reappraise the stimulus. Taken together, these literatures 
on anticipation and mind-wandering demonstrate that not only is the type of 
expectation—negative or positive—about an upcoming affective stimulus important in 
determining its impact on subsequent affective responses, but that similar regions of 
anterior PFC have been associated with the maintainance of both types of expectations.  
A third hypothesis is that regions involved in emotion-related processes may play 
key roles in setting adaptive or maladaptive expectancies. Here, prior work has suggested 
that the insula might play a key role. In addition to PFC, the insula has also been shown 
to be importantly involved in the anticipation and appraisal of emotional events, in 
addition to the integration of sensory and motor information (Augustine, 1996). 
Differences in anatomy (Mesulam & Mufson, 1982a, 1982b; Mufson & Mesulam, 1982, 
1984) and resting-state functional connectivity (Deen, Pitskel, & Pelphrey, 2011) have 
been reported within the insula, with separate subregions for posterior, ventral anterior, 
and dorsal anterior insula, each of which have been shown to have slightly different 
functional specializations. In particular, posterior insula has been more strongly 
associated with primary interoceptive representations of sensations from the body, while 
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increasingly anterior insula has been more associated with emotional and motivational 
states (Augustine, 1996; Craig, 2009; Nitschke, Sarinopoulos, Mackiewicz, Schaefer, & 
Davidson, 2006; Wager & Barrett, 2004). During implementation of reappraisal, insula 
activity—particularly posterior insula activity—has frequently been observed as being a 
regulatory target (i.e. showing greater activity during negative event appraisal relative to 
regulation) (Denny et al., 2009; Ochsner et al., 2002; Ochsner & Gross, 2008; Ochsner et 
al., 2004).  
The anterior insula, by contrast, has been strongly linked to integration of 
affective information and internally-focused awareness. While some researchers have 
reported the involvement of both dorsal and ventral anterior insula in interoceptive 
awareness (Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004), Wager and Barrett 
(2004) have provided evidence for a ventral-dorsal distinction in the anterior insula, such 
that ventral anterior insula is more strongly associated with emotional awareness 
(Carlson, Greenberg, Rubin, & Mujica-Parodi, 2011), and dorsal anterior insula is more 
strongly associated with updating goal states and top-down executive control (Nee, 
Wager, & Jonides, 2007; Wager, Jonides, & Reading, 2004). Ventral anterior insula 
activity has been reported during the anticipation of aversive events (Carlson et al., 2011; 
Kalisch et al., 2006), though these effects weren’t shown to be specifically attuned to 
negatively-valenced anticipation states (Carlson et al., 2011). The fact that anterior insula 
has been implicated broadly in both affective integration and cognitive control suggests 
that it has the potential to promote reappraisal success via integrating information about 
the body, one’s current emotional state and current task goals. 
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To differentiate among these three hypotheses, we employed a variant of a well-
studied reappraisal task (Ochsner & Gross, 2008). This task presents participants with 
aversive images and asks them either to let themselves respond naturally (i.e. baseline 
Look trials) or to reinterpret the meaning of the image in a way that lessens its unpleasant 
impact (i.e. Reappraise trials).  The present task modified the basic trial structure to insert 
an anticipatory gap between the presentation of the cue instructing participants that they 
would Look or Reappraise and the presentation of the aversive or neutral image.  
Using this design we adopted a three-step analysis procedure to address the three 
hypotheses enumerated above concerning the way in which expectations of the need to 
reappraise influence subsequent neural and behavioral responses to affective events. We 
reasoned that the best way to determine how expectations influence ultimate reappraisal 
success was by first identifying a signature of successful reappraisal.  To do this, our first 
step involved correlating reappraisal success (defined as the drop in self-reported 
negative affect on Reappraisal as opposed to Look trials) with activity in the amygdala, 
which is the affect-related region most commonly modulated by reappraisal of negative 
emotion (Ochsner & Gross, 2008).  This identified a region of the left amygdala whose 
activity during reappraisal of an aversive image was negatively correlated with 
reappraisal success.  In the second step, we used Mediation Effect Parametric Mapping 
(MEPM) to test for the hypothesized relationships among anticipatory neural activity, 
amygdala activity during reappraisal, and self-reports of negative affect (Atlas et al., 
2010; Wager, Davidson et al., 2008). Here, we aimed to determine whether and how 
brain activity during anticipation of reappraisal (i.e. in the 6 s before the image to be 
reappraised was presented) is associated with subsequent reappraisal success, mediated 
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by stimulus-related activity in the functionally defined area of the left amygdala 
described above.  On one hand, if anticipating reappraisal enhances regulatory success, 
then we should find that anticipatory activation of reappraisal-related regions leads to 
larger drops in negative affect via down-regulation of subsequent amygdala responses to 
aversive images. On the other hand, if anticipating reappraisal diminishes regulatory 
success, then we should find that anticipatory activation of reappraisal-related regions 
leads to smaller drops in negative affect via a failure to down-regulate subsequent 
amygdala responses to aversive images.  
Finally, in the third step, we sought to determine how well our mediation results 
fit with prior work on related cognitive and affective phenomena (e.g. the default mode, 
various forms of cognitive control, expectancies, emotional responses and judgments of 
self and other).  We deemed this important because it would help constrain the functional 
interpretation of our results by telling us how the regions we see active during 
anticipation are similar to or different than those implicated in other behaviors.  To do 
this, we used pattern expression analyses to test the functional coherence between our 
mediation results and the results of related prior studies as approximated by Neurosynth 
software (Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 2011). 
Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-six healthy participants (mean age=22.0 years; 13 female) were recruited 
in accordance with the human subjects regulations of Columbia University and were paid 
$20/hour for their participation. All participants were right-handed as measured by the 
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory and were screened with questionnaires to ensure good 
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general health and fMRI scan eligibility. Six participants were excluded prior to analysis 
because they were not within movement, normalization, or timing-accuracy tolerances. 
Thus, the present analyses were performed on data from 30 participants. 
Materials 
 The basic stimuli, task design, and procedures used in the current study have been 
detailed in a prior report focusing on activity solely during the presentation of aversive 
images (Wager, Davidson et al., 2008).  In this prior report the anticipation period was 
not examined. The current study focuses on the relationship between activity during the 
cue and anticipation periods and subsequent activity during the picture presentation 
period.   
 Forty-eight aversive images were selected from the International Affective Picture 
Set (IAPS; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & Hamm, 1993); mean normative valence = 2.24, 
mean normative arousal = 6.28), comprising a subset of those used in Ochsner et al. 
(2004), plus twenty-four neutral images (valence = 5.27, arousal = 3.51), for a total of 72 
test images. Each image subtended ∼12° visual angle when viewed inside the scanner.  
An additional set of 18 similarly valenced and arousing aversive images and 7 neutral 
practice images was used during a training session conducted prior to scanning (and 
described below).  
Task Design 
 Test images were presented in one of three conditions. For the LookNeu and 
LookNeg conditions, participants were shown either neutral or aversive images and were 
asked to look at the image, understand its content, and allow themselves to 
experience/feel any emotional response it might naturally elicit.  By contrast, for the 
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ReappNeg condition, participants viewed aversive images and were asked to reinterpret 
their meaning so that they felt less negative in response to them (cf. previous published 
work from our laboratory (Ochsner & Gross, 2008)). The assignment of negative images 
to conditions was randomized and counterbalanced across participants. Before 
presentation of each image, participants viewed a cue that signaled both the image type 
(aversive or neutral) and the instruction type (Look or Reappraise). Cues were white 
shapes—a circle, a square, and a triangle (∼0.5° visual angle)—presented on a black 
background. The assignment of shape to condition was counterbalanced across 
participants.  
 Previous studies of reappraisal have not separated brain activity related to 
anticipation and instruction processing, stimulus viewing, and picture rating, and a goal 
of our task design was to provide the ability to separately estimate the magnitude of brain 
activation related to each of these three phases of the image viewing and rating 
procedure. To accomplish this, a partial trial design was employed (Ollinger, Corbetta, & 
Shulman, 2001; Stern, Wager, Egner, Hirsch, & Mangels, 2007). Three variants of each 
task condition (LookNeu, LookNeg, and ReappNeg) were used, with an equal 
distribution of each type of trial: full (AntStim) trials, anticipation-only (AntOnly) trials, 
and stimulus-only (StimOnly) trials. On full trials, a 2 s instruction cue was followed by a 
4 s anticipatory interval during which a fixation cross was presented on the screen. An 
image was subsequently presented for 8 s, followed by a fixation cross for 4 or 7 s jittered 
interstimulus interval (ISI; uniform distribution of 4 and 7 s intervals). Following the ISI 
period, the words ‘‘How negative do you feel?’’ appeared onscreen for 2.1 s, and 
participants rated their current level of negative affect on a five-point scale by pressing a 
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button with one of five fingers on a button-response unit (0 = ‘‘not at all negative,’’ 
indicated by a thumb button press, up to 4 = ‘‘extremely negative,’’ indicated by a fifth-
finger button press). Following the rating, a 4 or 7 s jittered inter-trial-interval concluded 
the trial.  This trial structure is shown in Figure 1 for a full trial. The AntOnly trials were 
identical to the Full trials, except that the picture presentation period was omitted. The 
StimOnly trials were identical to the full trials, except that the 4 s anticipation interval 
was omitted.  
 This design allowed us to construct orthogonal predictors for Cue-, Anticipation-, 
and Image-related brain activity related to each trial type in the General Linear Model 
(GLM) that could provide efficient estimates of activation in each phase of the trial for 
each condition.  
Procedure 
 A comprehensive pre-scanning training procedure was used to assure that 
participants understood the cue-task associations and the reappraisal strategy (see Wager 
et al., 2008 for details). During the task in the fMRI scanner, 108 total trials were 
presented (36 trials per condition), according to the trial structure above. Within each 
condition, 12 trials were presented for each trial type (LookNeu, LookNeg, and 
ReappNeg) X trial type (full trial, AntOnly, StimOnly) combination. Following scanning, 
participants completed a post-task questionnaire during which they confirmed that they 
reappraised as instructed prior to being debriefed and thanked for their participation. 




 Behavioral data were analyzed using linear mixed models incorporating fixed 
effects estimates for trial type, condition, and their interaction, and a random effect 
consisting of an intercept for each participant.  
II. fMRI 
 Whole-brain fMRI data were acquired on a 1.5T GE Signa Twin Speed Excite 
HD scanner (GE Medical Systems). Functional and anatomical images were acquired 
with a T2*-sensitive EPI BOLD sequence with a TR of 2000 ms, TE of 40 ms, flip angle 
of 60°, field of view of 22 cm, 24 slices, and 3.44 × 3.44 × 4.5 mm voxels. Stimulus 
presentation and data acquisition were controlled using E-Prime software (PST Inc.). 
Data from one behavioral trial from one participant had to be discarded due to technical 
problems. Functional images were subjected to standard preprocessing using FSL 
(FMRIB Centre, University of Oxford) and SPM2 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive 
Neurology, UCL) software, and first-level (within-participant) statistical analysis using 
SPM2. Separate regressors in the GLM were specified for fMRI responses to the cue, 
anticipation, stimulus viewing, and rating response periods.  
II(a). Defining Amygdala Region-of-Interest 
 In order to address our first question of interest concerning how reappraisal 
expectations modulate subsequent behavioral and neural responses to affective events, we 
first subjected values for the [ReappNeg image viewing - LookNeg image viewing] 
contrast to second-level robust regression analysis (Wager, Keller, Lacey, & Jonides, 
2005) to localize regions correlated with reappraisal success, defined as each participant’s 
self-reported [LookNeg – ReappNeg] rating average. This reappraisal success regressor 
excluded ratings made during AntOnly trials, as those ratings were made on trials in 
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which no image was presented. We spatially limited this robust regression analysis to an 
a-priori region of interest, the amygdala, in order to define a seed region to be used in 
subsequent mediation analyses. Each participant’s global MR signal during the picture 
presentation period was used as a covariate in this analysis. Because signal in the medial 
temporal lobe is subject to signal drop out, and given our a-priori interest in the 
amygdala, threshold for this analysis was set at p<0.01 (one-tailed). 
II(b). Mediation Analysis 
 We then employed Mediation Effect Parametric Mapping (MEPM). The MEPM 
analysis is based on a standard three-variable path model (Baron & Kenny, 1986) where a 
predictor (X) is related to an outcome (Y) via a mediator (M).  For a mediation result to 
be significant, M must be related to X (path a), M must be related to Y after controlling 
for X (path b), and the indirect relationship (a*b) must also be significant. MEPM 
analysis was conducted on [ReappNeg - LookNeg] contrast values using a bias-corrected, 
accelerated bootstrap test for the statistical significance of the product a*b (Efron & 
Tibshirani, 1993; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). In order to compute contrast values suitable 
for a mediation analysis including activation during the full pre-stimulus anticipation 
window (i.e. for the cue and anticipation periods), a weighted sum of the beta estimate 
maps for cue and anticipation was computed for each participant using the sum of each 
respective column in the design matrices as the weight. Thus, these contrast values 
represented the total area under the curve (AUC) of the predicted time course for each 
condition. Contrast values were then built by taking the difference of the Reapp Neg and 
Look Neg AUC maps. 
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 MEPM analyses were then performed using the [ReappNeg – LookNeg] contrast 
values during the cue/anticipation period (the X or predictor variable), the stimulus 
presentation period (the M or mediator variable), and behavioral reappraisal success 
scores (the Y or outcome variable). We performed a MEPM analysis in which the 
mediator values were pre-defined as beta weights from the amygdala seed region, defined 
as described above, during the picture presentation period, and then the whole brain was 
searched for predictor (X) regions at cue/anticipation whose activity showed a 
relationship with reappraisal success (Y) that was mediated by the activity of the seed 
amygdala region (M) (Figure 2). In this analysis, by-participant average beta weights for 
global cue/anticipation activity (using the AUC images) and global stimulus presentation 
period activity were each entered as covariates.  
 Family-wise error thresholds for resulting mediation t-score (a*b) images were 
determined using AlphaSim (Ward, 2000). Significant clusters (FWE-corrected, p<0.05)  
were thresholded at p<0.05, uncorrected, with an extent of at least 50 voxels. For display 
purposes using NeuroElf software (neuroelf.net), mediaiton t-score images were then 
resliced to isometric voxels (2 x 2 x 2 mm), and family-wise error (FWE) multiple 
comparison correction thresholds were again determined using AlphaSim. Clusters were 
thresholded at p<0.05, uncorrected, with an extent of at least 333 voxels, resulting in a 
whole-brain corrected FWE rate of p<0.05.  
III. Pattern Expression Analysis 
 Finally, we performed a pattern expression analysis between the present 
mediation results and each of 13 task set maps derived via Neurosynth mapping of the 
extant literature (neurosynth.org) (Yarkoni et al., 2011). As detailed by Yarkoni and 
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colleagues, Neurosynth uses an HTML parser to search the continually evolving online 
database of thousands of recent neuroimaging studies for papers that contain distinct 
terms at sufficiently high frequencies (i.e. terms that occur in at least 20 studies). 
Neurosynth then extracts all coordinates from each paper associated with a given high-
frequency term. While the automated extraction algorithm does not distinguish between 
contrasts within a paper or between activations and deactivations, meta-analytic 
comparisons have shown that Neurosynth maps are nonetheless valid and reliable as a 
rough estimation of the neural correlates of various psychological phenomena (Yarkoni et 
al., 2011). To minimize differences among varying thresholding methods, unthresholded 
maps were used. 
 Whole-brain cross products were calculated between mediation t-statistic images 
from the present results and effect images from the neurosynth maps, which were 
generated for the following 13 search conditions associated with diverse cognitive and 
emotional phenomena: Maps corresponding to “emotion” (324 studies, including studies 
of pain and empathy) and “emotion regulation” (29 studies, including reappraisal and 
suppression) were of particular a priori interest, and the additional terms were chosen to 
approximate the neural correlates of additional affective (reward, autonomic, aversion, 
pain), cognitive (semantic, executive, reasoning), and social cognitive-related phenomena 
(self, default, episodic, social).  
Results 
Behavioral Results 
Figure 3 shows average negative affect ratings for each condition for AntStim and 
StimOnly trials and separately for anticipation only (AntOnly) trials. Negative affect 
25 
 
reports did not differ between AntStim and StimOnly trials (F(1,145)=.715, n.s.), nor was 
there a significant interaction between trial type and condition for AntStim and StimOnly 
trials (F(2,145)=1.733, n.s.), so data is shown collapsed across those two trial types. 
However, there was a main effect of condition (F(2,145)=428.36, p<0.001); negative 
affect ratings for both negative image viewing conditions (Reapp Neg and Look Neg) 
were significantly greater than those for the Look Neu condition (t(29)=12.59, p<0.001, 
and t(29)=22.62, p<0.001, respectively). Critically, among AntStim and StimOnly trials, 
reappraising negative images significantly modulated participants’ self-reported negative 
affect relative to responding naturally to negative images (t(29)=8.10, p<0.001).  
 For AntOnly trials, there was a main effect of condition (F(2,58)=10.14, 
p<0.001), with Look Neu ratings significantly lower than Look Neg (t(29)=3.29, 
p<0.003) and Reapp Neg (t(29)=4.78, p<0.001) ratings, but no significant difference 
between Look Neg and Reapp Neg ratings (t(29)=0.15, n.s.). 
I. Amygdala Region-of-Interest (ROI) 
In order to address our primary question regarding potential amygdala-mediated 
relationships involving anticipatory brain activation that are correlated with reappraisal 
success, we first carried out a robust regression analysis to determine which voxels in the 
amygdala showed activation during the stimulus presentation period that was 
significantly correlated with reappraisal success. Three voxels in the left amygdala were 
significantly negatively correlated with reappraisal success at the search threshold 
(p<0.01, one-tailed). These voxels in the left amygdala (MNI: [-21, -3, -23],   
 [-14, -7, -23], and [-17, -7, -23]) represented our amygdala seed ROI for the subsequent 
mediation analysis.  
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II. Mediation Analysis 
We found that a broad area of right rostrolateral PFC (RLPFC; BA 10) showed 
anticipatory activity prior to reappraisal that was negatively correlated with reappraisal 
success and significantly mediated by amygdala activity during the picture presentation 
period (Figures 2 & 4; Table 1). Increased anticipatory RLPFC activity was positively 
correlated with amygdala activation during the stimulus presentation period, and 
stimulus-related amygdala activity was negatively correlated with reappraisal success. In 
addition, a more dorsal medial PFC region (BA 8) also showed this negative mediated 
relationship, as did the posterior cingulate/precuneus, superior temporal 
gyrus/temporoparietal junction, and pre- and postcentral gyrus (Figure 4; Table 1).  
Several regions also showed a significant positively mediated relationship. We observed 
a significant positive mediation result in bilateral insula (Figure 4; Table 1). Left ventral 
anterior insula and right ventral mid-insula activity was positively correlated with 
reappraisal success, mediated by amygdala stimulus-related activity. Anticipatory insula 
activity in these ROI’s was negatively correlated with stimulus-related amygdala activity. 
Two separate clusters in the anterior lobe of the cerebellum also exhibited this pattern.  
In order to examine individual differences in relative recruitment of anticipatory regions 
associated with reappraisal success and failure, we assessed correlations between 
extracted beta-weights in these ROI’s. Anticipatory activity (Reapp Neg – Look Neg 
during cue/anticipation) from each insula cluster was positively correlated with activity 
from each PFC cluster (BA 8 and BA 10); right insula activity was correlated r=0.46, 
p<0.02 with BA 8, and r=0.60, p<0.01 with BA 10, whereas left insula activity was 
correlated r=0.48, p<0.01 with BA 8, and r=0.52, p<0.01 with BA 10. 
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III. Pattern expression analysis 
 We then tested the functional coherence between the present results (i.e. 
anticipatory brain activity related to reappraisal success and mediated by amygdala 
activity) and the existing neuroimaging literature for a variety of task sets, as 
approximated via Neurosynth software (Yarkoni et al., 2011).  The mediation results 
showed by far the best match (and most opposite pattern of functional coherence) with 
the default mode map, indicating that the present pattern of anticipatory regions 
predicting reappraisal failure and success is relatively opposite of the results observed for 
default mode activation (that is, negative mediation results were associated with default 
mode activations and positive mediation results were associated with default mode 
deactivations). However, the mediation results showed the greatest functional coherence 
with aversion, emotion, and autonomic task sets. Neurosynth maps are displayed in 
Figure 5A for default mode, social/mentalizing, executive, and autonomic-related 
activity, for purposes of comparison with the present mediation results for the same slices 
(Figure 5A, bottom). Figure 5B shows results of the pattern expression analysis between 
the present results and all 13 Neurosynth images. 
Discussion 
 The present results serve as the first investigation of mediated relationships 
among anticipatory brain activity and subsequent self-reported emotion regulation 
success. In this study we sought to identify regions of the brain that show anticipatory 
activity prior to the instruction to reappraise that predict changes in amygdala activity 
during reappraisal itself, which in turn predict changes in self-reported reappraisal 
success or failure. We found that anticipatory RLPFC activity, which is not typically 
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observed in reappraisal studies (Buhle et al., 2011), predicted increased amygdala activity 
during the picture presentation period, which in turn predicted reappraisal failure.  
Dorsomedial PFC, superior temporal gyrus, posterior cingulate/precuneus, and pre- and 
postcentral gyrus activity also predicted reappraisal failure, mediated by stimulus-related 
amygdala activity. In addition, we found that anticipatory activity in left anterior and 
right mid-insula, as well as cerebellum, predicted decreased stimulus-related amygdala 
activity and in turn greater reappraisal success. Notably, as substantiated in the pattern 
expression analysis, the network of brain regions that were related to reappraisal failure 
and success during the anticipation period did not bear great similarity to the network of 
regions recruited during emotion regulation implementation itself (Buhle et al., 2011). 
Implications for Neural Mechanisms of Expectancy x Regulatory Strategy Interactions 
I. Anticipatory Activity Associated with Less Regulatory Success 
In thinking about the meaning of anticipatory activations that predicted less 
reappraisal success it is important to emphasize that participants were not explicitly 
instructed to perform any regulation during the anticipation interval, in contrast to prior 
work (Delgado, Gillis et al., 2008; Delgado, Nearing et al., 2008; Herwig, Baumgartner et 
al., 2007; Kalisch et al., 2005). Rather, they were simply told to get ready for the 
upcoming picture and be ready to employ the cued strategy during the picture 
presentation.  
In this context it is interesting that we observed activity in RLPFC and other areas 
that have been associated with executive control and mentalizing, like the 
temporoparietal junction (Denny et al., in press).  RLPFC has been previously associated 
with emotional awareness and the self-generation of information - including intentions 
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for future actions (Burgess, Scott, & Frith, 2003; Christoff & Gabrieli, 2000; Costa et al., 
2011; Gilbert et al., 2006; Ochsner, Hughes et al., 2009; Ray et al., 2005). This suggests 
that the anticipatory RLPFC activity observed here may reflect self-generation of 
negative expectancies on the part of the participant (Sawamoto et al., 2000) in advance of 
the need to regulate that ultimately exert influence over their reappraisal success. Indeed, 
a very similar region of RLPFC has shown positive correlations with state negative affect 
when viewing aversive pictures (Nitschke et al., 2006).   
Additional regions that were negatively associated with reappraisal success have 
been associated with a network for mentalizing—i.e., thinking about one’s own or 
another’s mental state—including dorsomedial PFC, posterior cingulate/precuneus, and 
superior temporal gyrus/temporoparietal junction activity (Denny et al., in press; Gilbert 
et al., 2006; Qin & Northoff, 2011; van der Meer et al., 2010; Van Overwalle, 2009, 
2011).  In combination with RLPFC Activity, this suggests that participants may have 
been imagining how they might feel when the picture is presented, and were elaborating 
on it, which served to create a negative expectation that was ultimately confirmed and led 
to poorer regulation outcomes (Klaaren, Hodges, & Wilson, 1994; Wilson, Lisle, Kraft, 
& Wetzel, 1989).  
This interpretation raises the question of whether participants were feeling 
negative during the anticipation interval as a result of developing the proposed negative 
expectation. Given that we did not observe significant differences in self-reported 
negative affect scores for anticipation-only Reappraise and Look Negative trials, 
however, the idea that participants felt especially “negative” during reappraisal 
anticipation in particular is not supported in the present work. That said, the lack of 
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behavioral evidence for anticipatory negative affect may be due to the facts that 1) 
multiple brain regions exhibited anticipatory activity that was both positively and 
negatively associated with reappraisal success via amygdala activity, and 2) activity from 
regions of interest that positively (i.e. insula) and negatively (i.e. RLPFC) mediated 
reappraisal success were positively correlated. Thus, it’s possible that there are both 
benefits and costs of reappraisal anticipation, and this may have obscured a behavioral 
main effect on self-reported emotion (i.e. a general increase in anticipatory negative 
affect during reappraise trials). 
II. Anticipatory Activity Associated with Increased Regulatory Success 
In the present study, not all anticipatory activation was maladaptive, however. We 
observed a substantial area of left ventral anterior and right ventral mid-insula activation 
that predicted diminished amygdala activation during picture presentation and in turn 
ultimate reappraisal success. This result is consistent with prior work showing that the 
ventral anterior insula is importantly involved in integration of affective information, 
including meta-awareness of bodily states and awareness of emotional and motivational 
states more generally (Wager & Barrett, 2004), and that greater emotional awareness may 
yield better regulatory outcomes (Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & Benvenuto, 2001).  
Here, it is possible that greater insula activity reflects greater internal and emotional 
awareness, which in turn helps participants be ready to clearly identify their subsequent 
emotional responses to presented photos, which in turn helps them more easily pick 
effective reappraisals.  
In addition to insula, anticipatory cerebellar activity promoted reappraisal success 
via stimulus period amygdala deactivation.  This is consistent with work implicating 
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similar deep cerebellar foci in arousal and affective valuation (Stoodley & Schmahmann, 
2009; Wager et al., 2011; Wager, Barrett et al., 2008). 
Relationships to Other Phenomena 
The pattern expression analysis was designed to quantitatively assess the fit 
between the present results and meta-analytic maps corresponding to a variety of related 
phenomena, including across affective, cognitive, and social domains. The results of the 
pattern expression analysis support the conclusion that the regions that are negatively 
associated with reappraisal success are similar to those associated with the default mode 
(Gusnard et al., 2001; Raichle et al., 2001), as this was the overall best match. This result 
indicates that those regions that were negatively associated with reappraisal success in the 
mediation analyses are most closely linked to the positive activations associated with the 
default mode. As noted previously, important elements of the default mode network, 
including rostral MPFC, have been implicated in mind-wandering (Christoff et al., 2009; 
Mason et al., 2007). The pattern expression results described here bolster the 
interpretation that participants may have engaged in stimulus-independent thought, 
including mind-wandering, that was ultimately not productive or helpful.   
Finally, the findings of the current study are further illuminated when viewed in 
the context of prior studies that examined emotion regulation during anticipation of 
emotional events (Delgado, Gillis et al., 2008; Delgado, Nearing et al., 2008; Erk, Abler, 
& Walter, 2006; Herwig, Baumgartner et al., 2007; Kalisch et al., 2005). In one study, 
Herwig and colleagues reported that anticipatory posterior medial and dorsolateral PFC 
activity may serve to attenuate negative emotional processing and down-regulate 
anticipatory activity in the amygdala when using a “reality checking” emotion regulation 
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technique, similar to psychological distancing (Ochsner & Gross, 2008). By contrast, in 
the current experiment, participants were instructed to reinterpret stimuli by telling 
themselves a story about how the outcome is not as negative as it first seemed, and 
activation of a substantially more anterior MPFC region was associated with poorer 
regulation success. This region was also substantially more anterior relative to the regions 
associated with performing cognitive regulation (thinking safe, calming thoughts) in 
paradigms examining anticipation of physical pain (Delgado, Nearing et al., 2008; 
Kalisch et al., 2005) or rewarding outcomes (Delgado, Gillis et al., 2008). Prior to picture 
presentation, deliberating about what may be presented and how best to reinterpret it is 
premature, since there was no way to predict the content and themes of the upcoming 
picture (other than its global valence). We argue that this higher-order reasoning may 
have been subserved by RLPFC.  
In some support of this notion, Erk and colleagues (2006) report that a cognitive 
load (n-back) manipulation during anticipation did not significantly affect subsequent 
amygdala activity when a negative stimulus was presented, though there was some 
evidence of a trend in left amygdala. However, a region of anterior MPFC similar to the 
RLPFC results reported in this study was activated during anticipation of negative stimuli 
under conditions where participants were relatively free to let their minds wander (i.e. 
very low cognitive load). This is consistent with the results of the current study and the 
mind-wandering implications discussion above, as well as the idea that this area of rostral 
MPFC may play a role in abstract conceptualizations of unpleasant experiences (Amodio 
& Frith, 2006).  
Limitations and Future Directions 
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 Inasmuch as Study 1 advances our understanding of the mechanisms underlying 
the anticipation of emotion regulation, future research may target at least four questions 
not addressed here.  First, it is notable that we did not observe any significant direct 
relationships between anticipatory brain activity and reappraisal success in our mediation 
analysis (across entire whole-brain corrected clusters), even though the indirect mediation 
effects reported were significant. Future analyses may examine what accounts for this 
statistical suppression by examining additional third variables (including additional 
potential mediators) and may incorporate multilevel modeling, which would assess 
whether the reported effects hold within as well as between individuals.  
Second, in our study the nature of the expectancy was open-ended, in the sense 
that participants did not know the characteristics of the forthcoming stimulus (beyond its 
overall valence and whether it would be reappraised), and our reappraisal strategy 
required a stimulus-specific reinterpretation. Thus, we may have set participants up for 
some degree of failure insofar as their expectations couldn’t help but be incorrect and 
potentially unhelpful. Future work may unpack whether expectations about alternative 
types of reappraisal strategies may prove more adaptive. For example, one candidate is 
psychological distancing (Kross et al., 2009; Walter Mischel & Baker, 1975; Ochsner & 
Gross, 2008), which involves viewing a stimulus in a detached, objective, impartial 
manner. Such a strategy may invoke more of a task “mindset” that is not stimulus specific 
and relatively adaptive, even during anticipation. 
Third, future studies could incorporate psychophysiological data, such as skin 
conductance response and heart rate variability.  This would be useful to more completely 
establish the nature of participants’ emotional states during anticipation of reappraisal 
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and provide additional measures of changes in emotional response that might be 
differentially impacted by anticipation (Gross, 1998a; Urry, 2010). 
Finally, it would be very interesting to know whether individuals that vary within 
the normal or abnormal range of emotional responding and regulatory ability would show 
more or less RLPFC or insula activity during reappraisal anticipation.  Among healthy 
individuals, future work may examine individual differences that may lead to greater or 
less RLPFC activity, including whether adaptive response patterns are more prevalent 
over time in aging. Regarding clinical implications, in one of the few neuroimaging 
studies to investigate the anticipation of emotional stimuli in a clinical population, Abler 
and colleagues (2007) reported elevated dorsolateral PFC (BA 9) activation in depressed 
patients for anticipation of negative vs. positive stimuli in the absence of explicit 
instructions to subsequently regulate during stimulus presentation, which is consistent 
with the results of the current study (Abler, Erk, Herwig, & Walter, 2007).  It would be 
similarly interesting to know whether patients with different forms of psychopathology 
involving emotion dysregulation would show greater anticipatory RLPFC activity in our 
paradigm, coupled with diminished ability to subsequently down-regulate amygdala 
responses to aversive stimuli.  
 
 
Study 2: Behavioral Effects of Reappraisal Training (Denny & Ochsner, in prep.) 
Introduction 
 In addition to knowing how to adaptively anticipate reappraisal, a second question 
motivating the present work was whether one can become better at reappraising over time 
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with repeated practice. In other words, we sought to determine if self-reports of negative 
affect, both inside and outside the context of a laboratory task, would be reduced over 
time through a relatively short course of training in reappraisal. This question, while 
highly relevant to basic and translational research, has not been fully addressed in the 
literature. Studies 2 and 3 represent the first investigation into the longitudinal trainability 
of reappraisal.  
 While this question has not been examined directly, prior work in clinical 
contexts has substantiated the effectiveness of cognitive therapies that contain elements 
of reappraisal in addition to other regulation techniques, such as cognitive behavioral 
therapy (CBT) (Hollon & Beck, 1994). CBT involves “reality checking” of current 
patterns of reasoning, emotion, and behavior, and is individually tailored to the needs of a 
patient based on their history and treatment goals (Sheldon, 2011). This training 
timecourse is also generally extensive; a typical course of CBT often lasts for three 
months (Dobson, 2010). A recent review of meta-analyses of the effectiveness of CBT 
for various clinical disorders indicates that it is particularly effective in reducing reports 
of negative affect and clinical symptomology for unipolar depression, generalized anxiety 
disorder, panic disorder, social phobia, and posttraumatic stress disorder (A. C. Butler, 
Chapman, Forman, & Beck, 2006). In addition, dialectical behavior therapy (DBT), a 
CBT-based therapy, has been shown to be an effective treatment for borderline 
personality disorder, though again it involves training in disparate cognitive and 
behavioral strategies (Linehan, 1993; Linehan, Armstrong, Suarez, Allmon, & Heard, 
1991; Linehan et al., 1999).  
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 The present study, by contrast, sought to address three knowledge gaps 
simultaneously: (1) Can healthy participants benefit from reappraisal training? (2) Can 
the strategy be focused to only include reappraisal (and more specifically, either 
reinterpretation or distancing)? And finally (3) can a relatively short course of training 
(two weeks) lead to longitudinal adaptive effects on self-reported negative affect, both 
inside and outside of the laboratory? 
 We hypothesized that reappraisal would be an effective strategy that would exert 
adaptive longitudinal effects. Further, there is reason to believe that the longitudinal 
training profiles of reinterpretation and distancing may be different. As described 
previously, reinterpretation refers to recontextualizing an affective stimulus in a way that 
reduces its negative impact. For example, one could imagine that the events depicted in a 
negative image are not as bad as they first seemed, or that help is on the way. Distancing, 
by contrast, involves appraising a stimulus as a detached, objective, impartial observer, 
and/or imagining that whatever the stimulus is depicting occurred far away from me or a 
long time ago. One important distinction between these two strategies was described in 
the discussion of Study 1; reinterpretation, as described here, is a very context-specific 
strategy. Thus, it may be harder to adopt a facilitative reinterpretation mindset over time 
if instructions are stimulus-specific, though it is possible that some benefits may 
generalize. Distancing, on the other hand, can more easily be conceptualized as  
“mindset” of being detached, and as such, one might expect distancing to not only exert 
effects for regulation trials, but also for trials in which no regulation was explicitly 
instructed. Thus, if adopting a distanced mindset becomes more intuitive, it may exert 
effects even when the explicit instruction is to “look and respond naturally,” as is often 
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used in unregulated conditions in reappraisal work (Denny et al., under review; Ochsner 
& Gross, 2008). 
 Furthermore, when considering a reappraisal training paradigm, four conceptual 
factors need to be addressed: (1) the length of the training, (2) the specific strategy (or 
strategies) to be trained, (3) whether the training is distributed (over many days) or 
massed (repeated training exposures in a single day), (4) whether practice is with novel or 
repeated stimuli. 
In Studies 2-4, we sought to vary several of these factors in order to make initial 
inferences about the trainability of reappraisal, and future work will continue to vary 
these factors systematically. In Studies 2 and 3, we sought to use a relatively short course 
of training (two weeks) with training in either reinterpretation, distancing, or a control 
group that saw the same negative stimuli but were never cued to regulate and were 
always told to always look and respond naturally (the “Look Only” group). Further, we 
sought to examine training that is distributed in time (sessions every 2-5 days), with 
presentations of unique affective images during Sessions 1-3, and the same images from 
Session 1 presented at Session 4 to address test-retest reliability. In Studies 2 and 3 we 
sought to examine the duration of effects over the course of the two-week training period.  
Methods 
Participants 
 As detailed below, to increase power and reliability (and given a lack of 
interaction with whether one completed the task with psychophysiological recording), 
participants’ behavioral and questionnaire data was combined across Studies 2 and 3. 103 
participants from the Columbia University community gave informed consent and 
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completed the 4-session training procedure and were paid $20/hour for their participation. 
2 participants’ data were not analyzed due to too much elapsed time between sessions, 1 
participant’s data were not analyzed due to an inaccurate session number being entered 
into the computer program controlling the counterbalanced image display, and 1 
participant’s data were not analyzed due to being a behavioral outlier of more than 3.5 
standard deviations from the mean, with additional comments from the experimenter that 
the subject was not properly attending to the task. Thus, the current self-reported negative 
affect results reflect data from 99 participants (N=33 in each of Reinterpretation [mean 
age = 23.9 years, 26 female], Distancing [mean age = 23.9 years, 22 female], and Look 
Only groups [mean age = 22.4 years, 19 female]). Questionnaire reports from 3 
Distancing participants were not available due to technical difficulties with questionnaire 
data collection at Session 1. Participants reported no psychiatric history, no chronic pain 
or autoimmune disorders, no substance abuse, and no psychoactive medication use within 
the past 6 months.  
 Materials 
 99 aversive images were selected from the International Affective Picture System 
(IAPS) (Lang et al., 1993); mean normative valence = 2.39, mean normative arousal = 
6.02), along with 9 additional negative images that have been used in prior reappraisal 
studies (Ochsner et al., 2002; Ochsner et al., 2004), for a total of 108 negative task 
images. 54 neutral images from the IAPS were also shown; mean normative valence  = 
5.33, mean normative arousal = 3.15. An additional set of 18 similarly valenced and 
arousing images and 6 similarly valenced and arousing neutral images were used during 




 During each of 4 sessions, each spaced 2-5 days apart, participants (1) completed 
questionnaires, (2) received training in either reappraisal (reinterpretation or distancing) 
or the control instructions (Look Only), and then (3) completed an image-based task 
that’s very similar to the one reported in Study 1 and in prior work (Ochsner et al., 2002; 
Ochsner et al., 2004). Each of these 3 components is explained in more detail below. 
I. Questionnaires 
 Participants completed questionnaires at the beginning of every session. Two 
longitudinal questionnaires were given at all 4 sessions: the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; 
Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 1983) and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule 
(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). At Session 1, these questionnaire items 
were framed “In general”, and at Sessions 2, 3, and 4, they were framed “In the past few 
days”. The “in general” and “in the past few days” forms of the PSS are contained in 
Appendix A and B, respectively. During Session 1 only, participants also completed the 
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991).  
II. Training 
 At each of the 4 sessions, participants then were randomly assigned to receive 
training in either Reinterpretation, Distancing, or Look Only. Training consisted of an 
approximately 6-10 minute interaction with an experimenter in which a standardized set 
of instructions were given (see Appendices C-E for the training script for 
Reinterpretation, Distancing, and Look Only, respectively). In the course of these 
instructions, participants were first given instructions about the two cues that they would 
see: LOOK and DECREASE. For images preceded by a LOOK cue, participants were 
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instructed to simply look and respond naturally to the image. For images preceded by the 
DECREASE cue, participants were given standardized instructions in the appropriate 
strategy. Then, three “walk-through” images were presented. The first of these was a 
negative image to which participants were instructed to respond naturally. Then, two 
additional negative “walk-through” regulation training images were presented in which 
participants were asked to vocalize appropriate reappraisals (in the case of the 
Reinterpretation and Distancing groups) or to just look and respond naturally to the 
images (Look Only group). Participants were guided in their responses by the 
experimenter to focus on the appropriate strategy and were given examples following 
their self-generation in order to increase clarity. Experimenters were trained to spend 
more time explaining a strategy if participants could not self-generate an appropriate 
reappraisal. Walk-through images were unique for every session, and were 
counterbalanced across sessions. At Session 1 only, participants also completed 9 fixed-
pace practice trials that followed the timing of the actual image-based task, described 
below. 
III. Image-Based Task 
 The image-based task used was very similar to the one used in Study 1; the 
primary difference is that there was no anticipation interval. The trial structure for the 
task for Studies 2 and 3 is shown in Figure 6. For each trial, a cue (either LOOK or 
DECREASE) was presented for 2 s, followed by a neutral or negative IAPS image for 8 
s, followed by a fixation interval of either 2 or 4 s, then a rating period in which 
participants rated their current strength of negative affect on a scale of 1 (least) to 5 
(most) for 4 s, and finally and inter-trial fixation interval of either 2 or 4 s.   
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 As in Study 1, 3 different trial types (i.e. conditions) were presented at each 
session: “Look Neutral” (i.e. LOOK instruction paired with a neutral picture), “Look 
Negative” (i.e. LOOK instruction paired with a negative picture), and “Reapp Negative” 
(i.e. DECREASE instruction paired with a negative picture). 18 trials were presented per 
condition per session. The task was divided into 3 runs per session, with 6 trials per run 
per condition per session. Thus, 54 trials were presented per session total. Unique trials 
were presented at Sessions 1, 2, and 3. At Session 4, the task images from Session 1 were 
shown again (with conditions maintained) for test-retest purposes. Images were 
counterbalanced across sessions and conditions. Within runs, trials were presented in a 
randomized order. After Sessions 1-3, participants were thanked and reminded of their 
next session time. After Session 4, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
Data Acquisition and Analysis 
Behavioral and questionnaire data were analyzed using linear mixed models 
incorporating fixed effect estimates for group assignment, session, and condition, and 
their interactions, and a random effect consisting of an intercept for each participant. 
Planned paired and independent-sample t-tests were then performed to further investigate 
the effects. 
The only difference between Study 2 and Study 3 was that Study 3 participants 
completed the above procedure with the addition of psychophysiological recording 
equipment (to record heart rate, as detailed in Study 3) during the image-based task 
portion of the experiment. Prior to pooling behavioral data across Study 2 and 3, a mixed 
model ANOVA was performed incorporating the factors above (group, session, and 
condition), as well as a binary factor for whether participants received 
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psychophysiological recording or not. There was no main effect of receiving 
psychophysiological recording on negative affect reports, nor was there any two-way 
interaction with any of the other factors in the design. Therefore, to increase power and 
reliability, behavioral results were pooled across Studies 2 and 3 and reported below. 
Results 
Self-Reported Negative Affect 
 Figures 7-9 show average negative affect reports by condition and session for the 
Reinterpretation, Distancing, and Look Only groups, respectively. Figure 10 shows 
results for Reapp Negative trials across all three groups. Figure 11 shows results for Look 
Negative trials across all three groups. Error bars reflect standard error of the mean. 
There were significant main effects of group, F(2,97)=4.24, p<0.02 (with Distancing 
group ratings being lower), session F(3,928)=9.33, p<0.001 (with a downward trend in 
ratings over time), and condition F(2,928)=2301.65, p<0.001 (with a robust 
differentiation between negative and neutral trials). In addition, there was a significant 
interaction between Group and Condition, F(3,928)=9.96, p<0.001.  
For exploratory purposes, gender was also included in a separate analysis as a 
factor along with the other factors noted above in a full factorial linear mixed model. 
There was a significant interaction of Gender and Condition, F(2,899)=22.48, p<0.001. 
This interaction was further probed using independent-sample t-tests, indicating that 
reactivity (i.e. Look Negative – Look Neutral ratings) was significantly greater in females 
than males (p<0.001), and regulation capacity (i.e. Look Negative – Reapp Negative 
ratings) was also significantly greater in females than males (p<0.001), and that both of 
these effects were driven by significantly greater reports of negative affect in the Look 
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Negative condition in females relative to males (p<0.001). There was no significant main 
effect of gender on negative affect reports, however, F(1,92)=2.36, n.s., and all other 
interactions with gender were not significant. 
 To further probe longitudinal changes, paired t-tests first examined change over 
time in each condition and each group. For Reinterpretation, there was a significant 
decrease in negative affect over time in all three conditions (p<0.01 for Look Negative 
and Reapp Negative, p<0.03 for Look Neutral). Likewise, Distancing led to drops in 
ratings for all three conditions (p<0.01 for Look Negative, Reapp Negative, and Look 
Neutral). For the Look Only group, there was a significant decrease over time in the Look 
Negative condition (p<0.01 for Look Negative, n.s. for Look Neutral).  
 To further probe between-group differences, additional ANOVAs and 
independent-sample t-tests were performed for Reapp Negative and Look Negative 
ratings across groups. Reapp Negative ratings for the Reinterpretation and Distancing 
groups (Figure 10) showed a main effect of group, F(1,64)=5.00, p<0.03, with ratings for 
the Distancing group being lower overall. A main effect for session was also present, 
F(3,192)=9.45, p<0.001, indicating downward movement in ratings overall over time. T-
tests revealed a significant difference between groups at Session 1 (p<0.04) and Session 2 
(p<0.02), and a marginal effect at Session 4 (p<0.08), with lower ratings for the 
Distancing group. 
 Look Negative ratings showed a pattern more typical of a group X session 
interaction, though this was not significant, F(6,288)=1.66, p=0.131, n.s. There were, 
however, main effects of group, F(2,96)=3.67, p<0.03 (with the Distancing group 
showing lower ratings) and session, F(3,288)=17.50, p<0.001, indicating a general 
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downward trend in ratings over time.  T-tests revealed that Distancing group self-reports 
in the Look Negative condition were not significantly different from other groups at 
Session 1, but they were significantly lower than Look Only ratings at Session 2 
(p<0.05), Session 3 (p<0.02), and Session 4 (p<0.01). Distancing ratings were also 
significantly lower than Reinterpretation ratings at Session 2 (p<0.02) and Session 4 
(p<0.05), and marginally lower at Session 3 as well (p<0.08). Critically, the Distancing 
group showed a significantly larger drop over time than the Look Only group (p<0.05). 
This last analysis controlled for any baseline emotion differences by comparing 
longitudinal within-subject negative affect drops across groups. 
Questionnaire Reports 
 There were no baseline (Session 1) differences between groups in PANAS reports 
of positive and negative affect (all p>0.24). In addition, ruminative responses scores 
(RRS) did not differ between groups (all p>0.50). Further, there were no baseline 
differences in perceived stress (PSS) (all p>0.41). There were, however, interesting 
longitudinal changes in perceived stress. Figure 12 shows drops over time in perceived 
stress by group (Session 4 – Session 1), and Figure 13 shows perceived stress reports in 
each group over time. A mixed model ANOVA shows that there is no main effect of 
group, but there is a main effect of session, F(3,279)=2.88, p<0.04, with lower reports 
over time overall. The interaction between group and session is n.s. However, the 
Distancing group shows a significant drop over time in perceived stress (p<0.03), 
whereas the other two groups do not (Figure 12). Figure 13 indicates that the reduction in 
perceived stress in the Distancing group occurs relatively quickly—between the first and 
second session—and is then maintained in subsequent sessions, in contrast to other 
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groups. Independent-sample t-tests show that the change in perceived stress between 
Sessions 1 and 2 is significantly larger for the Distancing group relative to the Look Only 
group (p<0.02).  
Discussion 
 The present results represent the first investigation of the longitudinal trainability 
specifically of reappraisal in healthy adults. Results showed that individuals can indeed 
improve in their ability to down-regulate negative affect over time using reappraisal. In 
fact, there was evidence for longitudinal trainability in both reinterpretation and 
distancing, in that negative affect reports were shown to decrease over time, both when 
one is instructed to regulate and during uninstructed negative stimulus trials where one is 
simply instructed to look and respond naturally.  
 Distancing, however, led to lower negative affect reports when reappraising 
negative stimuli overall, relative to reinterpretation. Further, only distancing was 
associated with drops in negative affect over time for uninstructed trials (i.e. “look and 
respond naturally” trials) relative to the Look Only control group. This result is intriguing 
and suggests that distancing may become more “natural” over time after repeated 
practice, inasmuch as unregulated negative affect reports drop over time in a manner 
beyond what is attributable to habituation. If distancing becomes more automatic, even 
when you aren’t told to distance, it may show particular promise as a training strategy, 
and may show additional long-lasting adaptive consequences (some of which are 
explored in Study 4).  
 This interpretation was further bolstered by the results of the questionnaire 
analysis of perceived stress reports. Reports of perceived stress in daily life significantly 
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decreased over time for distancing, but not for reinterpretation or Look Only. Further, the 
perceived stress timecourse across groups (Figure 13) supports the idea that distancing 
yields a relatively large, sustained drop in stress in daily life that is not present in the 
other groups, despite good comparability between the groups in terms of demographic 
variables and similar levels of global positive and negative affect and rumination 
tendencies across groups. Though these results argue for the benefits of distancing 
training, the physiological mechanisms that accompany these benefits is currently 
unknown. Study 3 attempted to address this question. 
 
Study 3: Psychophysiological effects of reappraisal training (Denny & Ochsner, in 
prep.) 
Introduction 
 Study 2 suggested that we can improve over time in our ability to regulate 
negative emotions via reappraisal. However, does our physiological state reflect what our 
mind knows? Study 3 addressed this question by employing identical procedures to those 
used in Study 2, but added a continuous psychophysiological measurement—heart rate—
which has been shown to vary meaningfully in the context of affective appraisal (Bradley 
& Lang, 2007; Greenwald, Cook, & Lang, 1989; Hare, Wood, Britain, & Shadman, 1971; 
Lang et al., 1993) and reappraisal (Urry, 2010; Williams, Bargh, Nocera, & Gray, 2009).  
Heart rate is influenced by both the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous 
systems and has been shown to be an index of psychophysiological arousal (Vrana, 
Cuthbert, & Lang, 1989). Specifically during presentation of negative pictorial stimuli, 
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heart rate has been shown to decelerate (Bradley & Lang, 2007; Greenwald et al., 1989; 
Hare et al., 1971; Lang et al., 1993).  
In addition, Williams and colleagues (2009), Urry (2010), and Gross (1998a) 
investigated the impact of an instruction to reappraise on mean changes in heart rate 
when anticipating or experiencing negative events. Williams and colleagues found that 
regulating anticipatory anxiety (speech preparation) via reappraisal (distancing) led to 
decreases in mean heart rate responses relative to no regulation. However, there may be 
differences in the psychophysiological profiles of response between events like speech 
preparation in which you’re anticipating the negative event (as in Study 1) and times 
when a negative external stimulus is being presented to you (e.g. negative pictures and 
films).  
Two studies examined changes in heart rate and reappraisal during presentation of 
negative stimuli. Urry found that while heart decelerated for negative stimuli overall, and 
while the mean change in heart rate was lower during down-regulation of negative 
emotion via reappraisal (operationalized as reinterpretation) than during an unregulated 
look condition, this difference between reappraisal and the look negative condition was 
not significant. Gross similarly did not detect heart rate change differences between a 
reappraisal group (operationalized as distancing) and a separate group that did not 
perform regulation when looking at negative films. Gross notes that while this null 
finding is difficult to interpret, there are several possible alternative explanations. One 
possibility is that reappraisal does not influence heart rate physiology. However, another 
possibility, suggested by Gross among other alternatives, is that more detailed reappraisal 
instructions might engender a difference in heart rate response, with the hypothesis being 
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that reappraisal would then lead to greater heart rate deceleration relative to an 
unregulated control condition. This hypothesis was tested in Study 3. 
Methods 
Participants 
 Study 2 gave recruitment details that also apply to Study 3. Of the 103 
participants who were recruited to participate in Studies 2 and 3, 52 were recruited for 
Study 3. As noted above, 1 participant’s data were not analyzed due to being a behavioral 
outlier of more than 3.5 standard deviations from the mean, with additional notes from 
the experimenter that the subject was not properly attending to the task. Thus, 51 
participants for Study 3 were distributed across the three groups: Reinterpretation, N=17 
(mean age = 22.9 years, 13 female); Distancing, N=17 (mean age = 23.6 years, 12 
female); and Look Only, N=17 (mean age = 23.2 years, 11 female). During heart rate 
analysis, 7 out of 51 participants were found to have excessively noisy physiological data 
and were excluded from the heart rate analysis. Thus, the reported heart rate averages are 
derived from 14 Reinterpretation participants (mean age = 23.6 years, 10 female), 16 
Distancing participants (mean age = 23.6 years, 11 female), and 14 Look Only 
participants (mean age = 23.1 years, 10 female).  
Materials 
 Materials were the same as in Study 2. 
 Procedure and Data Acquisition 
 The procedure was identical to Study 2, with the exception that participants also 
underwent concurrent physiological recording. When participants entered the testing 
room to receive training and complete the image-based task, they were connected to a 
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Biopac ECG module (Biopac Systems, Goleta, CA) via two disposable circular 
electrodes. One electrode was placed on the right side of the participant’s neck, and the 
second electrode was placed above the hip and below the rib cage on the participant’s left 
side. Heart rate responses were then checked by the experimenter to ensure appropriate 
signal discrimination, and after this verification the physiological recording monitor was 
turned off for the duration of the image-based task. ECG was acquired continuously at 
1,000 Hz. Following connection to physiological recording, the participant completed the 
training and image-based task as described in Study 2. 
Data analysis 
 After data collection, heart rate data were first low-pass filtered twice using a 
0.025 s kernel and subsequently filtered using the squared first derivative of the ECG 
signal. R-spikes were then detected using Neuroelf software (neuroelf.net). The 
timecourse was then visually inspected. Areas flagged to contain imperfect spike 
detection were examined by the experimenter, and the experimenter added and/or deleted 
beat detection in these areas by hand in order to minimize any artifactual intervals 
between beats (Urry, 2010). Data were then resampled first to 100 Hz, and then a 
continuous beats per minute (BPM) function was constructed for each participant at 10 
Hz. Heart rate responses were then averaged by conditon for each participant at each 
session with the subtraction of a baseline heart rate occurring 0.1 s prior to the onset of 
the trial phase of interest. For the heart rate change timecourses shown in the results, this 
baseline was 0.1 s prior to the cue period onset, in order to show heart rate change 
associated with the cue and stimulus periods, as well as the first 2 s of post-stimulus 
fixation, for visualization purposes. For the heart rate change averages during the 
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stimulus period described in the results, this baseline was 0.1 s prior to stimulus period 
onset, with the averaging period being the 8 s stimulus period. Thus, this heart rate 
measure indicates accelerations or decelerations (in BPM) relative to the baseline BPM 
immediately preceding the onset of the trial phase of interest. 
Results 
 Figures 14-16 show mean heart rate change timecourses for each condition at 
each session for the Reinterpretation, Distancing, and Look Only groups, respectively. 1 
participant in the Reinterpretation group and 3 participants in the Look Only group had 
excessively noisy physiological signal in one or more intervening sessions (Sessions 2-3) 
and were excluded from these timecourse plots, though their usable data was still 
included in the average stimulus period plots described below.  
Figures 17-19 show average heart rate change during the stimulus period for each 
group (Reinterpretation, Distancing, and Look Only, respectively). A mixed model 
ANOVA indicated main effects of session [F(3,393)=6.93, p<0.001], with general 
upward trends in heart rate change, and condition [F(2,390)=39.48, p<0.001], with Look 
Neutral heart rate changes being greatest overall. There was also a marginal interaction 
between group and condition, F(3,390)=2.48, p<0.07. To probe this interaction further, 
paired and independent-sample t-tests were performed. Look Neutral responses 
significantly increased over time in the Distancing group (p<0.01), while Reapp Neg 
responses significantly increased over time in the Reinterpretation group (p<0.02). No 
other conditions showed significant change over time. In the Reinterpretation group, 
while Reapp Neg heart rate change was lower than Look Neutral heart rate change at 
every session (all p<0.03), Reapp Neg heart rate change was never significantly different 
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from Look Neg heart rate change at any session. In the Look Only group, Look Negative 
and Look Neutral responses were only significantly different at Session 3, where Look 
Neutral was significantly greater (p<0.04). At Session 4, there was a trend toward lower 
heart rate change for Look Negative trials in the Look Only group (p<0.14).  
With respect to the marginal group*condition interaction, while most conditions 
in each group showed upward trends in heart rate change over time, Reapp Neg responses 
in the Distancing group decreased over time, though this change over time was not 
significant. While there were no baseline (Session 1) differences across conditions for 
Distancing, Look Negative and Reapp Negative responses were increasingly 
differentiable over time. In particular, by Session 4, there is a significant difference 
between Look Negative and Reapp Negative heart rate change in the Distancing group 
(p<0.02). Further, comparing the within-subject differences between Look Negative and 
Reapp Negative heart rate changes over time reveals significant differentiation; the 
difference between Look Negative and Reapp Negative is significantly greater at Session 
4 than at Session 1 in the Distancing group (p<0.03). The same comparison is not 
significant for the Reinterpretation group (p=0.76, n.s.).  
Discussion 
 In this study, we have provided the first evidence of increasing differentiability 
over time between heart rate responses for reappraised versus unregulated negative 
pictorial stimuli. This differentiation tracks with having received increasing training in 
reappraisal (and getting better at reappraising as a result), with heart rate change lower 
for reappraisal than for an unregulated negative condition, a possibility that was 
suggested by Gross (1998a). We further replicated prior work showing that, in general, 
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heart rate decelerates when appraising negative stimuli relative to neutral stimuli 
(Bradley & Lang, 2007; Greenwald et al., 1989; Hare et al., 1971; Lang et al., 1993). 
 This increasing differentiation of reappraised and unreappraised negative items in 
the Distancing group may reflect additional ability to effectively orient attention to the 
task when distancing at later sessions relative to earlier sessions, given that heart rate 
deceleration in general has been linked with this process in the context of appraising 
negative information (Hare et al., 1971). Effective instruction in reappraisal can be 
thought of as a process of attentional reorienting, with attention disengaging from the 
initial appraisal of an affective stimulus and toward the cognitive re-construal of it 
(Garland, Gaylord, & Park, 2009). Thus, one consequence of our training manipulation 
may have been to increase the specificity of this orienting process for reappraisal.  
In this regard, it makes sense that such a finding would be observed for 
distancing, considering that the results of Study 2 suggested that distancing training 
yields significant improvements in affect both inside and outside of the laboratory. One 
question that might be posed relates to why we did not see the same pattern of effects in 
Look Negative trials as compared to Reappraise Negative trials in terms of heart rate 
change, given the results of Study 2 that showed that there are significant decreases over 
time in negative affect for both Look Negative and Reappraise Negative trials. One 
explanation is that, while Look Negative ratings do drop over time in Distancing (and in 
Reinterpretation and Look Only, though significantly greater than Look Only in the case 
of Distancing), negative affect reported during Look Negative trials is still always higher 
than negative affect reported during Reappraise Negative trials, at all sessions. Thus, the 
increasing differentiation that we have observed here for distancing may help confer the 
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additional negative affect drop (via explicit regulation) that is observed when 
reappraising negative stimuli. 
 
Study 4: Behavioral and neural mechanisms of reappraisal massed practice 
Introduction 
 To this point, I have examined the temporal dynamics of reappraisal by assessing 
the most adaptive patterns of looking forward (i.e. anticipation; Study 1) and the benefits 
of reappraisal training during the training period (Studies 2 and 3). Study 4 sought to 
extend this framework by looking backward; what are the long-term consequences of 
reappraisal training, even after the training period has ended? Addressing this question 
could elaborate on the promise of reappraisal training and suggest future avenues of 
research. 
 As reviewed earlier, while numerous studies have established that reappraisal 
involves engagement of lateral and medial prefrontal cortex activity coupled with 
attenuation of amygdala activity (Buhle et al., 2011; Denny et al., under review; Ochsner 
& Gross, 2008), these studies have almost all been designed to examine the neural 
mechanisms subserving active reappraisal implementation when a novel affective 
stimulus is presented. One study has recently been published examining the extent to 
which amygdala activity remains attenuated during passive viewing that occurs 10 
minutes after active reappraisal, and results showed that reappraisal (via distancing) does 
involve a sustained drop in amygdala activity relative to an unregulated condition (Walter 
et al., 2009). Further, an additional study from this group of authors extended this same 
dataset to examine the neural correlates of recognition memory for reappraised versus 
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unreappraised items one year after encoding, and has found that previously reappraised 
items were associated with less amygdala activity than unregulated items that are 
correctly remembered, although interestingly unregulated items that were not correctly 
remembered did not show significant amygdala activation relative to baseline (Erk, von 
Kalckreuth, & Walter, 2010). Thus, there is some evidence that regulation responses are 
maintained (at least in the short term and in the long term when making an explicit 
memory judgment), but there is a knowledge gap as to whether repeated practice confers 
a benefit over one-time reappraisals in terms of long-term neural reactivity in areas of a 
priori interest such as the amygdala.   
Thus, the present study aimed to address: (1) the long-term sustainability of 
reappraisal-related amygdala attenuation during passive re-presentations of reappraised 
and non-reappraised stimuli, and (2) whether having had additional practice reappraising 
certain negative stimuli would lead to greater endurance of amygdala attenuation for 
those stimuli in particular. We aimed to simultaneously address both of these questions. 
We predicted that, one week following reappraisal, there will still be significant 
attenuation of amygdala activity for stimuli that one has reappraised repeatedly relative to 
stimuli that were previously seen and not reappraised (and relative to new negative 
stimuli).  
 Our plan for addressing these questions involved considerations of the reappraisal 
training design factors reviewed in Study 2. Specifically, with respect to the four factors 
(training duration, strategy, distributed versus massed training, and novel versus repeated 
stimuli), we chose to investigate the long-term (one week) effects of massed practice in 
reappraisal with the same stimuli (performed over the course of one training day) relative 
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to appraisals and reappraisals of comparable unregulated stimuli. In light of the results of 
Studies 2 and 3, we chose to employ the distancing strategy, given that distancing 




 Twenty-two healthy participants were recruited in accordance with the human 
subjects regulations of New York University and were paid approximately $120 for the 
entire experiment ($50 for each of two scanning sessions plus $10/hour for the initial 
behavior-only reappraisal training session). Five exclusions were made for the following 
reasons: one participant had incorrect images shown at the final scanning session; one 
participant was a behavioral outlier (>3 standard deviations from the mean for negative 
affect reports during the training session), and there was evidence that the participant had 
not been engaged in performing the task; due to a technical problem, one participant had 
an unbalanced number of regulation versus no regulation training blocks; one participant 
repeatedly fell asleep during the task, including for entire runs; and one participant 
showed unacceptably large functional image distortions due in part to repeated 
repositioning in the scanner. Thus, the present results reflect data from 17 healthy 
participants.  
Materials 
 180 aversive images were drawn from the International Affective Picture System 
(Lang et al., 1993) (mean normative valence = 2.42, mean normative arousal = 5.75) 
along with 36 neutral images (mean normative valence = 5.51, mean normative arousal = 
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3.29). An additional set of 12 similarly valenced and arousing negative images were used 
during training and practice (described below). 
Procedure 
 Participants completed 3 sessions over the course of 9 days, which included a 
behavior-only training session (Day 1), and two fMRI scanning days (Days 2 and 9). The 
task design is summarized in Figure 20.  
I. Day 1 
On the first day (“T1”), participants first received training in distancing using an 
instruction script and procedure that was very similar to the one described in Studies 2 
and 3 (and Appendix D). As before, participants were told that they would see a number 
of images during the experiment. They were told that, for the first type of task that they 
would perform, they would see a number of trials, each beginning with a cue word 
presented in the center of a computer screen: either LOOK or DECREASE. For LOOK 
trials, participants were asked to look and respond naturally to the forthcoming image. 
For DECREASE trials, participants were walked through how to view the forthcoming 
image as a detached, objective impartial observer, and/or imagine that the pictured events 
occurred far away or a long time ago. The same walk-through procedure (with participant 
self-generation of appropriate reappraisals) as in Studies 2 and 3 was employed, with 1 
LOOK and 2 DECREASE walk-through trials being performed. Participants then 
completed a fixed-timing practice with 3 LOOK and 3 DECREASE trials. 
Participants then completed the image-based task described in Studies 2 and 3 at a 
computer. In contrast to Studies 2 and 3, participants completed 6 runs of trials that were 
blocked by condition, and images were repeated in like blocks. Specifically, participants 
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completed 3 runs of DECREASE trials and 3 runs of LOOK trials. Each run contained 36 
negative image trials, and the blocks were repeated such that each LOOK and 
DECREASE trial was presented 3 separate times. The block presentation order always 
alternated between LOOK and DECREASE blocks, and whether the first block was 
LOOK or DECREASE was counterbalanced across participants. Within each run, trials 
were presented in randomized order. Further, negative images were separately randomly 
assigned to condition prior to generating the task scripts for each participant, for this and 
all subsequent conditions in the experiment, with the stipulation that the randomized 
condition assignments could not result in any pair-wise significant or marginal (p<0.10) 
differences between normative valences and arousals across all conditions in the 
experiment. The trial structure was very similar to the one used in Studies 2 and 3: the 
cue slide was presented for 2 s, followed by presentation of the image for 8 s, followed 
by a fixation interval of between 3 and 7 s (average = 4 s), followed by a negative affect 
rating period for 3 s, followed by an inter-stimulus fixation interval of between 3 and 7 s 
(average = 4 s). Following the completion of the sixth task block, the participant was 
reminded of the next session. 
  II. Day 2 
 Participants returned for an fMRI scan one day later on Day 2. Participants were 
first given an additional walk-through training of the distancing instructions (with unique 
walk-through images that were counterbalanced with those given at T1 across 
participants). Next, participants entered the fMRI scanner and completed an 8 minute 
resting state scan during which they were instructed to have whatever thoughts and 
feelings they naturally have, to keep their eyes closed, but to remain awake. Data from 
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this and subsequent resting state scans were not examined in the present analyses. Then, 
participants completed the active regulation task (“T2”) using the same trial structure and 
same two cues (LOOK or DECREASE) as T1. At T2, 180 total image trials were shown. 
The 36 Look Negative and 36 Distance Negative massed practice images from T1 were 
presented along with 36 novel Look Negative and 36 novel Distance Negative trials, and 
36 novel Look Neutral trials. These 180 trials were evenly distributed into 6 functional 
runs, with 6 trials/condition/run. Within a run, trials were presented in randomized order.  
 Immediately following T2, participants completed another 8 minute resting scan. 
Immediately following the resting scan, participants completed a passive viewing scan 
(“T3”) in which half of the images presented during T2 plus 18 novel negative images 
were presented for 2 s each with instructions to simply view the images (Walter et al., 
2009). No cues were presented. The trial structure consisted of image presentation for 2 s, 
followed by an inter-stimulus fixation interval of between 3 and 7 s (average = 4 s). All 
108 images were presented in a single run, in randomized order. 
III. Day 9 
 One week after T2/T3, participants returned for an fMRI scan on Day 9. 
Participants first underwent an 8 minute resting state scan, followed by a passive viewing 
scan (“T4”) in which the other half of images from T2 were shown, along with 18 novel 
negative images using the same trial structure as T3. As in T3, all 108 images were 
presented in a single run, in randomized order. Following T4, a final 8 minute resting 
state scan was performed. 




 Behavioral data were analyzed using linear mixed models incorporating fixed 
effect estimates for condition (Look Neutral, Look Negative, and Distance Negative) and 
novelty (practiced versus un-practiced images), and a random effect consisting of an 
intercept for each participant. 
II. fMRI 
 Whole-brain fMRI data were acquired on a 3.0T Siemens Allegra MRI system. 
Anatomical and functional images were acquired with a T2*-sensitive EPI BOLD 
sequence with a TR of 2000 ms, TE of 15 ms, flip angle of 82°, 34 slices, with 3mm 
isometric voxels, no interslice gap. Stimulus presentation and behavioral data acquisition 
were controlled using E-Prime software (PST Inc.). Functional images were subject to 
standard preprocessing using SPM8 software (Wellcome Department of Cognitive 
Neurology, UCL). A random-effects GLM was then run using Neuroelf v0.9c software 
(neuroelf.net) incorporating task regressors for T2, T3, and T4. For T2, separate 
regressors for fMRI responses to cue (differentiated by whether the cue was LOOK or 
DECREASE), stimulus presentation (differentiated by 5 conditions: Look Neutral, Look 
Negative – NEW, Look Negative – PRACTICED, Distance Negative – NEW, and 
Distance Negative – PRACTICED), and rating period (undifferentiated by conditon) 
were specified. For T3 and T4 separately, regressors for each stimulus presentation 
period were specified (i.e. for T3: Look Neutral, Look Negative – NEW, Look Negative 
– PRACTICED, Distance Negative – NEW, Distance Negative – PRACTICED, and 
Novel Negative. Separate regressors for the analogous trials shown at T4 were also 
specified). Regressors were convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function 
(HRF). Motion estimates for each participant were also entered into the GLM. Beta 
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estimates underwent a percent signal change transformation. The GLM was computed 
using ordinary least squares regression and random effects modeling. Contrasts were then 
performed on the beta estimates for planned comparisons of reactivity (Look Negative > 
Look Neutral) and regulation (Distance Negative > Look Negative) at T2, and 
comparisons across conditions at T3 and T4. Data were visualized and thresholded (see 
Results) using Neuroelf, and beta estimates were extracted for a priori regions of interest 
(i.e. the amygdala and prefrontal cortex). 
Results 
Behavioral Results 
 Figures 21 and 22 show behavioral results for T1 and T2, respectively. Significant 
reductions in negative affect ratings over the course of the three blocks were observed in 
both Look Negative (p<0.01) and Distance Negative (p<0.01) practice. There was no 
significant drop between blocks 2 and 3 for Look Negative practice, however, while this 
drop was significant for Distance Negative practice. 
 At T2 (Figure 22), there was a significant main effect of condition, 
F(2,64)=112.98, p<0.01. Further, there were significant differences between negative 
affect ratings between practiced and unpracticed stimuli for both Look Negative practice 
(p<0.02) and Distance Neg practice (p<0.01).  
fMRI Results 
 For fMRI analyses, there were two a priori regions of interest: the amygdala and 
the prefrontal cortex. At T2, significant amygdala reactivity was observed for a contrast 
of novel Look Negative images versus Look Neutral images. Figure 23 (left) shows 
masked right amygdala reactivity for this contrast, thresholded at p<0.05 (Family-wise 
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error [FWE]-corrected, with thresholds of p<0.05, uncorrected, and an extent threshold of 
93 voxels, determined using AlphaSim (Ward, 2000)). The displayed region-of-interest 
(ROI) represents a 32 voxel sub-cluster of an FWE-corrected region of activation as 
defined above, with peak voxel of [21, -3, -21] (MNI). Figure 23 (right) shows beta 
estimates for each condition at T2 averaged across the 32 ROI voxels for each 
participant. In addition to the significant reactivity effect, this ROI also showed a 
significant effect of regulation for novel stimuli; NEW Distance Neg activity was 
significantly attenuated relative to NEW Look Neg activity (p<0.02). This same 
comparison for practiced stimuli was not significant, despite a trend toward lower activity 
for practiced distance stimuli (p=0.13, n.s.). In this ROI at T3, practiced distance stimuli 
showed lower activity than novel negative stimuli (p<0.01) and NEW Look Negative 
stimuli (p<0.03). At T4, practiced distance stimuli showed lower activity than practiced 
Look Neg stimuli (p<0.03). In this ROI, practiced Look Neg stimuli showed significantly 
increased activity from T3 to T4 (p<0.05). 
 The second a priori ROI was prefrontal cortex. Figure 24 (left) shows left 
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) activity for a contrast of NEW Distance Neg 
versus NEW Look Neg stimuli. Data were FWE-corrected (p<0.05) using thresholds of 
p<0.05 (uncorrected) and extent = 93 voxels. The ROI displayed in Figure 24 represents 
a cluster of 454 voxels active for this contrast, with peak activation at [-42, 45, 9] (MNI). 
Figure 24 (right) shows beta estimates in this ROI during the task at T2. All beta 
estimates were significantly different from each other pair-wise (p<0.05) with the 
exception of Look Neutral and NEW Look Negative. In this ROI, at both T3 and T4, 
there are no significant differences between practiced Distance Neg activity and other 
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conditions, with the exception of novel negative stimuli (each p<0.03), which show less 
activity.  
 At T4, a slightly more posterior right amygdala ROI showed significant response 
sustainability for distance massed practice relative to all other negative image conditions 
(Figure 25). This ROI was defined from a contrast of practiced look versus practiced 
distance stimuli, taking a spherical of 1mm radius around [25, -9, -21] (7 voxels), given 
our a priori interest in amygdala activity and our explicit hypothesis that distancing 
would lead to sustained decreases in activity in the amygdala. This ROI is illustrated in 
Figure 25 (left). In this ROI, activity for practiced distancing stimuli is significantly 
lower than all other conditions (p<0.05), with the exception of Look Neutral (Figure 25, 
right).  
Discussion 
 Study 4 was designed to address whether reappraisal massed practice yields long-
term adaptive consequences. We first validated that massed practice leads to reductions 
in self-reported negative affect, which we observed, though we also observed this effect 
for look practice with negative images (i.e. a within-subject habituation control). 
However, later fMRI data differentiated the pattern of responses for distance practice 
versus look practice.  
Our a priori hypothesis was that reappraisal training using distancing would 
modulate long-term reactivity in neural appraisal systems, in particular in the amygdala 
(Erk et al., 2010; Gross, 1998a; Walter et al., 2009). Indeed, this is what we observed 
using a targeted region of interest analysis focusing on the amygdala and an area of the 
VLPFC that has been commonly linked to implementation of reappraisal strategies 
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(Buhle et al., 2011; Ochsner & Gross, 2008). Replicating prior work, the right amygdala 
showed significant reactivity to novel negative versus neutral stimuli during an active 
regulation task (as used in Studies 1-3), and was significantly attenuated for when 
distancing from novel stimuli relative to looking at novel stimuli.  Amygdala reactivity to 
look and distance practiced stimuli was initially comparable, however, suggesting that 
training effects may be attributable to habituation. 
These and prior data suggest three lines of argument for why the observed effects 
are unlikely to be solely attributable to habituation. First, it’s not surprising that we 
observed a suppression of activity for look practiced stimuli at T2. Some habituation 
would be expected (cf. Study 2), but Studies 2 and 3 indicate that, during active receipt of 
distancing training, there is a significant transference of the distancing strategy to 
unregulated stimuli that is significantly greater than what is attributable solely to 
habituation. Given the amount of practice and instruction that one has had with distancing 
by T2 (two training sessions on two consecutive days, and 108 task regulation trials by 
the start of T2), it’s not surprising that there could be carry-over.  
Second, the neural correlates of regulation (i.e. Distance Neg > Look Neg) at T2 
provide further support for this notion. We observed an increasing step-wise pattern of 
response in VLPFC, a brain area previously importantly linked to reappraisal 
maintenance and success (Wager, Davidson et al., 2008), such that practiced distance 
stimuli showed the highest level of activity, but also that practiced look stimuli showed 
more VLPFC activity at T2 than unregulated look negative stimuli (and more than look 
neutral stimuli). This suggests that participants may indeed be implicitly bringing 
regulatory resources to bear on the stimuli to which they have been repeatedly exposed 
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but which they have not been told to regulate while at the same time receiving regulation 
training for other stimuli. 
The third reason that the massed practice present effects are unlikely to be 
attributable to habituation is that, by the second passive viewing scan, reactivity in a 
slightly more posterior amygdala region differentiates between stimuli for which one has 
received massed practice in distancing versus massed practice in looking and responding 
naturally. In particular, amygdala reactivity at T4 is significantly lower for distancing 
massed practice than for every other condition, with the exception of look neutral. One 
question that may be raised is why we did not observe continued transference of the 
distancing pattern to the formerly unregulated trials even at T4. One reason may lie in the 
fact that in both Studies 2-3 and Study 4, transference was able to occur during relatively 
long stimulus presentation periods for each condition (8 s). In the two passive viewing 
scans in this experiment, stimuli were presented for only 2 s each, which may have not 
allowed sufficient time for the transference to fully occur. Alternatively, as discussed in 
Study 3, while transference was observed in the prior training studies, it did not carry all 
of the adaptive effects of regulation (cf. Study 3). Relatedly, stimuli for which one has 
had only one opportunity to distance may not be a sufficient amount of time or practice 
for effective consolidation into a less reactive representation when one encounters the 
stimulus again.   
 Further, these data suggest a mechanism whereby responses to distance stimuli 
for which one has received mass practice may be “neutralized” over time. Amygdala 
reactivity to massed distancing practice stimuli starts fairly low and remains that way. 
However, VLPFC activity is initially high (highest of all conditions) for massed 
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distancing practice stimuli, but a week later VLPFC is not particularly recruited for these 
stimuli at the same time that the amygdala is continuing to show low reactivity for them. 
In addition, reactivity to look practiced stimuli actually increases over time in the 
amygdala, driving some of the reactivity differences between T2 and T4. This may reflect 
the fact that whatever reactivity attenuation is present for these look practiced stimuli 
(due to whatever factor), the suppression of amygdala activity for such stimuli is fleeting 
without the added focus of distancing practice, which may improve long-term memory 
consolidation (McGaugh, 2000).  
While we did observe sustained reductions in amygdala activity one week after 
regulation, we did not observe this pattern as reported by Walter and colleagues (2009) 
eight minutes after regulation for negative stimuli that were regulated at all versus 
negative stimuli that were not regulated. While this null result may stem from a variety of 
factors, beta estimates at T3 in the amygdala ROI’s reported here did show the general 
trend reported by Walter and colleagues (i.e. negative regulated<negative unregulated), 
but the inter-subject error was too great to substantiate effects at this time point. Walter 
and colleagues did report having participants wait approximately 10 minutes after 
regulation to passively view, whereas our interval was closer to 8 minutes. Future work 
may indicate whether this time discrepancy was significant with respect to the amount of 
time necessary for consolidation effects to emerge in this reappraisal paradigm.  
Further, future work may further investigate how massed reappraisal practice 
affects declarative memory in addition to passive reactivity, and whether effects of 
reappraisal training persist for even longer than a week. Doing so would continue to put 
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the results of the present study in context, as the long-term consequences of reappraisal 
training are beginning to be explored.  
 
General Discussion 
 This dissertation has sought to elucidate the temporal dynamics of reappraisal, a 
cognitive emotion regulation strategy that has been shown to be effective in down-
regulating negative affect in single experimental sessions without maladaptive impacts on 
psychophysiology or other cognitive costs that have been associated with response-
focused emotion regulation strategies like expressive suppression (Gross, 1998a, 1998b; 
Gross & John, 2003; Gross & Munoz, 1995; Jackson, Malmstadt, Larson, & Davidson, 
2000; Ochsner & Gross, 2005, 2007; Richards & Gross, 2000b). However, as reviewed in 
this dissertation, several key questions regarding reappraisal have been relatively under-
studied: how can we effectively look forward to reappraisal (Question 1), how can we get 
better at reappraising over time through training, and are certain reappraisal strategies 
better than other (Questions 2 and 3), and what adaptive long-term consequences does 
reappraisal training have (Question 4)?  
These four questions have been addressed through a series of four experiments 
that have argued for the usefulness of reappraisal as a training strategy. In Study 1, we 
observed that engaging brain areas previously associated with mind-wandering and 
stimulus-independent thought during anticipation of reappraisal was associated with less 
ultimate self-reported reappraisal success, mediated during the reappraisal itself by the 
activity of the amygdala, a brain area closely linked to negative affective reactivity that 
represented an a priori region of interest in Studies 1 and 4 (Denny et al., 2009; Ochsner 
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& Gross, 2007, 2008). By contrast, engaging ventral anterior insula, previously 
associated with affective integration and interoceptive awareness (Augustine, 1996; 
Wager & Barrett, 2004) during anticipation was associated with greater reappraisal 
success, again mediated by amygdala activity. These results are interesting given that our 
reappraisal strategy for when stimuli were actually presented was reinterpretation, a 
context-driven strategy that may not have given participants enough information to 
prepare effective reappraisals for upcoming regulation trials, and may have led some 
participants to engage in unproductive mind wandering. 
The results of Study 1 suggested that there might be meaningful differences 
between two types of reappraisal strategies: reinterpretation and psychological distancing. 
When down-regulating negative emotion, reinterpretation involves recontextualizing an 
affective stimulus so that events are not as bad as they first seemed (Ochsner et al., 2002; 
Ochsner & Gross, 2008; Ochsner et al., 2004). Distancing, by contrast, involves adopting 
a detached, objective, impartial mindset (Gross, 1998a; Kross et al., 2009; Ochsner et al., 
2004) or imagining that negative events occurred far away from you or a long time ago 
(Liberman et al., 2007; Trope et al., 2007).  
Thus, one interesting distinction between the two reappraisal strategies, borne out 
of the current pattern of results in Studies 2 and 3, is that distancing may invoke more of 
a global “mind-set” whereas reinterpretation may be geared more toward individual 
context-dependent affective instances, as least as it has been typically operationalized to 
this point. Studies 2 and 3 were motivated by the idea that while many clinical treatment 
modalities exist that employ elements of reappraisal (Hollon & Beck, 1994; Sheldon, 
2011), reappraisal itself has not been examined for its effectiveness as a longitudinal 
68 
 
training strategy in healthy adults. We found that a relatively short (two week) course of 
reappraisal training in either reinterpretation or distancing involved longitudinal 
decreases in negative affect during an image-based regulation task. However, negative 
affect was lower for distancing participants, despite a lack of baseline differences in 
affective responsivity prior to training onset (Watson et al., 1988). Further, distancing 
was uniquely associated with drops in negative affect that were larger than what could be 
attributed to habituation (via a control group that saw the same stimuli but with no 
training in regulation and no instruction to regulate). These drops in negative affect over 
time came even for unregulated trials in addition to regulated trials, suggesting that there 
may be some carry-over of the effects of distancing training to instances in which one is 
not instructed to regulate and is instead simply instructed to respond naturally. Thus, 
distancing may become more natural over time. Distancing was further uniquely 
associated with longitudinal drops in perceived stress in daily life (Cohen et al., 1983; 
Appendices A and B). Finally, in Study 3, distancing was uniquely associated with 
longitudinal differentiation of heart rate responses to regulated versus unregulated 
negative stimuli. Despite prior null effects in single experimental sessions, the hypothesis 
that reappraisal training may differentiate mean changes in heart rate, with heart rate 
changes lowest for reappraised stimuli, has been considered previously (Gross, 1998a), 
and this is in fact what we observed. These changes may reflect greater attentional 
orienting that one is employing when performing reappraisal by distancing (Garland et 
al., 2009; Hare et al., 1971). Further work may continue to probe the connection between 
the self-reported behavior and psychophysiological response patterns when receiving 
training in distancing. 
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 Finally, in addition to this evidence that there are adaptive effects of distancing 
training during the period of time when it is trained, a final important question concerned 
whether there were adaptive effects of training that persisted even after the training 
period (Study 4). Given the results of Studies 2 and 3, we used distancing as our training 
strategy. In addition, as discussed in Study 2, any training paradigm must make decisions 
with respect to the length of training, whether the training is distributed or massed, and 
whether training and practice occur with novel or repeated stimuli. Given that these 
variables have not been systematically manipulated previously, we chose to focus on the 
effects of massed practice in distancing with the same stimuli in order to compare to the 
distributed practice employed in Studies 2 and 3. Study 4 was particularly designed to 
assess the neural mechanisms of adaptive or maladaptive patterns of response. 
Specifically, two regions of interest were targeted: the amygdala and the (particularly 
lateral) prefrontal cortex, given their extensive prior association with reappraisal 
reactivity and regulation, respectively (Buhle et al., 2011; Denny et al., 2009; Ochsner & 
Gross, 2007, 2008). We observed that distancing massed practice was uniquely 
associated with sustained decreases in amygdala activity during passive re-encounters 
with negative stimuli one week after the end of training. Thus, the present results have 
implications for the ability of healthy adults to benefit from reappraisal training, and 
elucidates some of the basic mechanisms by which these benefits may occur.  
Further, these results suggest future avenues of research examining whether 
various clinical populations may similarly benefit from reappraisal training courses. I am 
currently engaged in research at the Mount Sinai School of Medicine in a longitudinal 
examination of the effectiveness of reappraisal training (by distancing) in borderline 
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personality disorder, a population that exhibits characteristic and pronounced emotion 
dysregulation (Koenigsberg et al., 2009; Koenigsberg et al., 2002; Linehan, 1993; 
Linehan et al., 1991). Understanding whether courses of training in distancing (or other 
cognitive change strategies) are effective in clinical populations could ultimately lead to 
the development of more targeted translational therapies that could increase and improve 
treatment options for various populations that could benefit. As alluded to in the Frost 
quote given at the beginning, cognitive transformations and re-construals have the 
potential to powerfully and adaptively re-shape our affective experiences across a variety 
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Figure 2. Mediation path diagram showing the predictor search variable (Reapp Neg – 
Look Neg brain activity during cue/anticipation), a priori mediator variable (amygdala 
activation during the picture presentation period), and outcome variable (reappraisal 
success self-reports). a and b are indirect paths, c is the total relationship, and c’ is the 





Figure 3. Negative affect ratings. Black bars represent negative affect ratings from trials 
containing a picture presentation (i.e. full AntStim trials and StimOnly trials) and gray 





Figure 4. Brain activity during cue/anticipation that satisfies the mediated relationship 
depicted in Figure 2. Orange-to-yellow regions show a positive mediated relationship, 
such that increases are associated with greater reappraisal success, mediated by amygdala 
activity during picture presentation. Blue-to-green regions show a negative mediated 
relationship, such that more activity in these regions at cue/anticipation is associated with 




Figure 5. Pattern expression analysis results. A, Top four rows: Brain maps derived from 
Neurosynth depicting activations (yellow) and deactivations (blue) for various mental 
task sets. A, bottom row: Present mediation results, showing anticipatory activity 
associated with reappraisal success via positive (yellow) and negative (blue) mediation 
pathways, with FWE-corrected results outlined in dark yellow and purple, respectively. 
B: Pattern expression analysis results comparing current mediation results to various 
Neurosynth-derived task maps. A larger positive number along the x-axis reflects greater 
coherence between the Neurosynth map and the present mediation results, whereas a 







































Figure 14. Reinterpretation timecourses for mean heart rate change by session and 





Figure 15. Distancing timecourses for mean heart rate change by session and condition. 






Figure 16. Look Only timecourses for mean heart rate change by session and condition. 


































Figure 23. Right amygdala ROI (left) for a contrast of New Look Negative versus Look 





Figure 24. Left VLPFC ROI (left) for a contrast of New Distance Negative versus New 













Table 1. Brain activity during cue/anticipation that shows a significant amygdala-
mediated relationship with reappraisal success (a*b mediation path).  Regions are whole-
brain FWE-corrected at p<0.05 with thresholds of p<0.05 and k ≥ 50 voxels. Coordinates 
are in MNI space. For each cluster, path coefficients, t-scores, and significance levels are 





The questions in this scale ask you about your feelings and thoughts in general. In each case, please 
indicate how often you generally feel or think a certain way. 
 
1. In general, how often do you become upset because of something that happens unexpectedly? 
___0=never ___1=almost never ___2=sometimes ___3=fairly often ___4=very often 
 
2. In general, how often do you feel that you are unable to control the important things in your life? 
___0=never ___1=almost never ___2=sometimes ___3=fairly often ___4=very often 
 
3. In general, how often do you feel nervous and "stressed"? 
___0=never ___1=almost never ___2=sometimes ___3=fairly often ___4=very often 
 
4. In general, how often do you feel confident about your ability to handle your personal problems? 
___0=never ___1=almost never ___2=sometimes ___3=fairly often ___4=very often 
 
5. In general, how often do you feel that things are going your way? 
___0=never ___1=almost never ___2=sometimes ___3=fairly often ___4=very often 
 
6. In general, how often do you find that you cannot cope with all the things that you have to do? 
___0=never ___1=almost never ___2=sometimes ___3=fairly often ___4=very often 
 
7. In general, how often are you able to control irritations in your life? 
___0=never ___1=almost never ___2=sometimes ___3=fairly often ___4=very often 
 
8. In general, how often do you feel that you are on top of things? 
___0=never ___1=almost never ___2=sometimes ___3=fairly often ___4=very often 
 
9. In general, how often are you angered because of things that are outside of your control? 
___0=never ___1=almost never ___2=sometimes ___3=fairly often ___4=very often 
 
10. In general, how often do you feel difficulties are piling up so high that you cannot overcome them? 





The questions in this scale ask you about your feelings and thoughts in the past few days. In each case, 
please indicate how often you felt or thought a certain way. 
 
1. In the past few days, how often have you been upset because of something that happened unexpectedly? 
___0=never ___1=almost never ___2=sometimes ___3=fairly often ___4=very often 
 
2. In the past few days, how often have you felt that you were unable to control the important things in your 
life? 
___0=never ___1=almost never ___2=sometimes ___3=fairly often ___4=very often 
 
3. In the past few days, how often have you felt nervous and "stressed"? 
___0=never ___1=almost never ___2=sometimes ___3=fairly often ___4=very often 
 
4. In the past few days, how often have you felt confident about your ability to handle your personal 
problems? 
___0=never ___1=almost never ___2=sometimes ___3=fairly often ___4=very often 
 
5. In the past few days, how often have you felt that things were going your way? 
___0=never ___1=almost never ___2=sometimes ___3=fairly often ___4=very often 
 
6. In the past few days, how often have you found that you could not cope with all the things that you had 
to do? 
___0=never ___1=almost never ___2=sometimes ___3=fairly often ___4=very often 
 
7. In the past few days, how often have you been able to control irritations in your life? 
___0=never ___1=almost never ___2=sometimes ___3=fairly often ___4=very often 
 
8. In the past few days, how often have you felt that you were on top of things? 
___0=never ___1=almost never ___2=sometimes ___3=fairly often ___4=very often 
 
9. In the past few days, how often have you been angered because of things that were outside of your 
control? 
___0=never ___1=almost never ___2=sometimes ___3=fairly often ___4=very often 
 
10. In the past few days, how often have you felt difficulties were piling up so high that you could not 
overcome them? 




Instructions for Emotion Regulation task 
 
Intro screen 
In this task, what we are really interested in is people’s ability to change how they are 
feeling.  And the way we are going to ask you to change how you are feeling is by 
changing the way you think about something that we show you.  So what’s going to 
happen is that you will see a series of pictures, and some of them are going to make you 
feel somewhat negative or very negative, and some pictures might not make you feel very 
negative at all.   
 
“Look” instruction 
Before each picture, you are going to see one of two instructions that tells you what you 
are going to do while the picture is on the screen.  The first instruction you might see is 
the “look” instruction.  When you see the instruction to look, we want you to look at the 
picture, keep your eyes on it the whole time, and allow yourself to respond naturally to it. 
So have whatever thoughts and feelings you would naturally have in response to that 
picture.   
 
“Decrease” instruction 
The other instruction you will see is to “decrease”.  When you see the instruction to 
decrease we want you to think of something to tell yourself that helps you to feel less 
negative about the picture.  So for example, you could tell yourself something about the 
outcome, so that whatever is going on will soon be resolved, or that help is on the way.  
You could also focus on a detail or aspect of the situation that isn’t quite as bad as it first 
seemed.  But we want you to stay focused on the picture, not mentally distance yourself 
from the content of the picture, and not think of random things that make you feel 
better, but rather to change something about the picture that helps you to feel less 
negative about it. Does that make sense?  We’ll do some practice in a few seconds so you 
can do it for yourself.   
 
Rating screen 
So after the picture is on the screen you will see a scale like this which will ask you to 
indicate how negative you feel.  It goes from 1 to 5, where 1 means that you don’t feel 
negative at all, and 5 means that you feel very strongly negative.  2, 3, and 4 are in 
between.  We realize that sometimes you won’t feel negative at all, sometimes you might 
have started to feel negative and then tried to decrease how negative you felt and that 
worked really well, and sometimes you attempt to decrease how negative you feel but 
couldn’t think of something in time or it didn’t really work that well.  So no matter what 
happened through the course of looking at the picture, try to rate at the end how negative 
you feel when all is said and done, so where you ended up after all you tried to do.  Does 
that make sense?  Try to be as honest as you can about how you feel.  
Here are how the trials will actually go when you are doing the task. First you’ll see a 
fixation cross in the center of the screen. When you see it, just relax, stay focused on the 
screen, and get ready for the next part of the trial or for a new trial to begin. [NOW have 




Look Cue screen 
Since the instruction is look, do you remember what you are supposed to do? 
 
 
Keep looking at the picture the whole time, pay attention to the picture and respond as 
you naturally would. [always restate this - some people say to just ‘stare at it’, but we 
want them to take it in and pay attention] 
 
Look Picture screen, Rating screen 
So that’s one of the pictures you might see, then honestly rate about how negative you 
feel.   
 
 
Decrease1 Cue screen 
So then when you see the instruction to decrease, do you remember what you are 
supposed to do?   
 
Right, try to think of the picture in a way that helps you to feel less negative.  [always 
restate this in these words] 
 
Decrease1 Picture screen 
So for this picture, what might you tell yourself to feel less negative? 
 
Great, so perhaps [give sample reinterpretation]. That’s a great way to think about it 
differently to help you feel less negative.  So the whole time the picture is up, once you 
think of something that helps you feel less negative, really try to convince yourself of that 
and really believe it so that you decrease how negative you feel as much as you can while 
the picture is on the screen.  Hopefully that will come to you fairly quickly.   
 
Just to give you an idea of the range of things that some other people have said in 
response to this picture [give another sample reinterpretation].  Any of those kinds of 
things could work.   
 
You might end up reusing some of the kinds of things that you tell yourself, so there 
might be other pictures where it also works to tell yourself, “oh it looks like they’re 
getting help and they’ll be better soon”.  And that’s ok, you can reuse those general 
categories of things to tell yourself, but every time a picture comes on the screen take a 
moment to think of the very best thing to tell yourself for that particular picture.  We just 
don’t want you to get to the point where you are applying the exact same change to every 
picture when the instruction is “Decrease”.  We really want you to actively think of the 
best way to change how you’re feeling without mentally distancing yourself from the 
content of the picture. In other words, stay engaged in the content of the photo, but 
tell yourself something about the picture that helps you feel less negative. Then, really 
try to convince yourself of that for the rest of the time that the picture is on the screen 





So again, when you see the 1 to 5 scale, indicate how negative you feel when all is said 
and done and you’ve tried as hard as you can to convince yourself the way you were 
thinking about it was true.  
 
Decrease2 Picture screen 
So now here’s another example of decrease.  So what could you tell yourself to feel less 
negative?  
 
Right, exactly.  Just to give you other ideas, [give sample reinterpretations]. 
 
Once you’ve come up with a way to feel less negative, keep repeating it to yourself when 
the instruction is to “Decrease”.  Then be honest about how negative you feel when you 
make your rating. 
 
Get Ready screen 
Now what will happen is we will go through some trials exactly as they will appear in the 
actual task.  So they will move along at a fixed pace.  The two things to keep in mind are 
1) that the rating scale will only be on the screen for a certain amount of time.  So be sure 
to press the button when you actually see the scale from 1 to 5 on the screen.  If you press 
it slightly before or after we might night get your response.  Then the other thing to keep 
in mind is 2) that the pictures are up there for a good amount of time but not forever. So 
again you really want to try to think of something relatively quickly that is the best fit for 
that picture and then apply it for the rest of the time.  And sometimes when the 
instruction is “decrease” you might not be able to think of something in time, some of 
them might just be a little bit overwhelming, and we understand that.  Just be honest 
when the rating scale comes up.   
 






Instructions for Emotion Regulation task 
 
Intro screen 
In this task, what we are really interested in is people’s ability to change how they are 
feeling.  And the way we are going to ask you to change how you are feeling is by 
altering the way you think about the personal relevance of a situation. Specifically, 
we are interested in what happens when people try to decrease negative emotional 
responses by changing their personal connection to what is happening. So what’s 
going to happen is that you will see a series of pictures, and some of them are going to 
make you feel somewhat negative or very negative, and some pictures might not make 
you feel very negative at all.   
 
“Look” instruction 
Before each picture, you are going to see one of two instructions that tells you what you 
are going to do while the picture is on the screen.  The first instruction you might see is 
the “look” instruction.  When you see the instruction to look, we want you to look at the 
picture, keep your eyes on it the whole time, and allow yourself to respond naturally to it. 
So have whatever thoughts and feelings you would naturally have in response to that 
picture.   
 
“Decrease” instruction 
When you see the instruction Decrease, we would like you to mentally distance yourself 
from the pictured events in such a way that your emotional response is decreased or 
attenuated.  To do this, you should view the photos with a detached, objective, impartial, 
and scientific mindset, and/or imagine that the pictured events happened far away or a 
long time ago. As you view each pictured event, what is critical is that you cut all 
personal ties to the event in a way that any negative emotional reaction is decreased or 
attenuated as much as possible. 
 
Rating screen 
So after the picture is on the screen you will see a scale like this which will ask you to 
indicate how negative you feel.  It goes from 1 to 5, where 1 means that you don’t feel 
negative at all, and 5 means that you feel very strongly negative.  2, 3, and 4 are in 
between.  We realize that sometimes you won’t feel negative at all, sometimes you might 
have started to feel negative and then tried to decrease how negative you felt and that 
worked really well, and sometimes you attempt to decrease how negative you feel but 
couldn’t think of something in time or it didn’t really work that well.  So no matter what 
happened through the course of looking at the picture, try to rate at the end how negative 
you feel when all is said and done, so where you ended up after all you tried to do.  Does 
that make sense?  Try to be as honest as you can about how you feel.  
Here are how the trials will actually go when you are doing the task. First you’ll see a 
fixation cross in the center of the screen. When you see it, just relax, stay focused on the 
screen, and get ready for the next part of the trial or for a new trial to begin. [NOW have 





Look Cue screen 
Since the instruction is look, do you remember what you are supposed to do? 
 
 
Keep looking at the picture the whole time, pay attention to the picture and respond as 
you naturally would. [always restate this - some people say to just ‘stare at it’, but we 
want them to take it in and pay attention] 
 
Look Picture screen, Rating screen 
So that’s one of the pictures you might see, then honestly rate about how negative you 
feel.   
 
Decrease1 Cue screen 
So then when you see the instruction to decrease, do you remember what you are 
supposed to do?   
 
Right, try to think of the picture in a distanced way that helps you to feel less 
negative by viewing the photos with a detached mindset or imagining that the event 
occurred far away or a long time ago.  [always restate this in these words] 
 
Decrease1 Picture screen 
So for this picture, what might you tell yourself to feel less negative? 
 
Great, so perhaps [give sample distancing interpretation]. That’s a great way to 
distance yourself from it to help you feel less negative.  So the whole time the picture 
is up, once you think of something that helps you feel less negative, really try to convince 
yourself of that and really believe it so that you decrease how negative you feel as much 
as you can while the picture is on the screen.  Hopefully that will come to you fairly 
quickly.   
 
Just to give you an idea of the range of things that some other people have said in 
response to this picture [give another sample distancing interpretation].  Any of those 
kinds of things could work.   
 
You might end up reusing some of the kinds of things that you tell yourself, so there 
might be other pictures where it also works to tell yourself, “it happened a long time 
ago or it’s happening far away from me”.  And that’s ok, you can reuse those general 
categories of things to tell yourself, but every time a picture comes on the screen take a 
moment to think of the very best thing to tell yourself for that particular picture.  We 
just don’t want you to get to the point where you are applying the exact same change to 
every picture when the instruction is “Decrease”.  We really want you to actively think of 
the best way to change how you’re feeling and then really try to convince yourself of that 
for the rest of the time that the picture is on the screen when the instruction is to 







So again, when you see the 1 to 5 scale, indicate how negative you feel when all is said 
and done and you’ve tried as hard as you can to convince yourself the way you were 
thinking about it was true.  
 
Decrease2 Picture screen 
So now here’s another example of decrease.  So what could you tell yourself to feel less 
negative?  
 
Right, exactly.  Just to give you other ideas, [give sample distancing interpretation]. 
 
Once you’ve come up with a way to feel less negative, keep repeating it to yourself when 
the instruction is to “Decrease”.  Then be honest about how negative you feel when you 
make your rating. 
 
Get Ready screen 
Now what will happen is we will go through some trials exactly as they will appear in the 
actual task.  So they will move along at a fixed pace.  The two things to keep in mind are 
1) that the rating scale will only be on the screen for a certain amount of time.  So be sure 
to press the button when you actually see the scale from 1 to 5 on the screen.  If you press 
it slightly before or after we might night get your response.  Then the other thing to keep 
in mind is 2) that the pictures are up there for a good amount of time but not forever. So 
again you really want to try to think of something relatively quickly that is the best fit for 
that picture and then apply it for the rest of the time.  And sometimes when the 
instruction is “decrease” you might not be able to think of something in time, some of 
them might just be a little bit overwhelming, and we understand that.  Just be honest 
when the rating scale comes up.   
 





In this task, what we are really interested in is people’s feelings as they look at 
pictures showing scenes of different emotional strength. What’s going to happen 
is that you will see a series of pictures, and some of them are going to make you 
feel somewhat negative or very negative, and some pictures might not make you 
feel very negative at all.   
 
“Look” instruction 
Before each picture, you are going to see an instruction that tells you what you 
are going to do while the picture is on the screen.  Specifically, you’ll see the 
“look” instruction.  When you see the instruction to look, we want you to look at 
the picture, keep your eyes on it the whole time, and allow yourself to respond 
naturally to it. So have whatever thoughts and feelings you would naturally have 
in response to that picture.   
 
Rating screen 
So after the picture is on the screen you will see a scale like this which will ask 
you to indicate how negative you feel.  It goes from 1 to 5, where 1 means that 
you don’t feel negative at all, and 5 means that you feel very strongly negative.  
2, 3, and 4 are in between.  We realize that sometimes you won’t feel negative 
at all, and sometimes you might feel very negative. Try to be as honest as you 
can about how you feel. [NOW have subject hit a sample rating between 1-5 
to advance the slide] 
Ok, so now we’ll complete some practice trials. 
 
Look Cue screen 
Since the instruction is look, do you remember what you are supposed to do? 
[That’s right], keep looking at the picture the whole time, pay attention to the 
picture and respond as you naturally would. [always restate this - some people 
say to just ‘stare at it’, but we want them to take it in and pay attention] 
 
Look Picture screen, Rating screen 
So that’s one of the pictures you might see, then honestly rate about how 
negative you feel.   
 
Next you’ll see a fixation cross in the center of the screen. When you see it, just 
relax, stay focused on the screen, and get ready for a new trial to begin. 
 
Instruction screen 
Now what will happen is we will go through some trials exactly as they will 
appear in the actual task.  So they will move along at a fixed pace.  One thing to 
keep in mind is that the rating scale will only be on the screen for a certain 
amount of time.  So be sure to press the button when you actually see the scale 
from 1 to 5 on the screen.  If you press it slightly before or after we might not get 
your response.  Any questions? 
